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In this paper we argue that the persistent global imbalances, the subprime crisis, and the
volatile oil and asset prices that followed it, are tightly interconnected. They all stem from
a global environment where sound and liquid ﬁnancial assets are in scarce supply.
Our story goes as follows: Global asset scarcity led to large capital ﬂows toward the
U.S. and to the creation of asset bubbles that eventually crashed. The crash in the real
estate market was particularly complex from the point of view of asset shortages since it
compromised the whole ﬁnancial sector, and by so doing, closed many of the alternative
saving vehicles. Thus, in its ﬁrst phase, the crisis exacerbated the shortage of assets in the
world economy, which triggered a partial recreation of the bubble in commodities and oil
markets in particular. The latter led to an increase in petrodollars seeking ﬁnancial assets
in the U.S. Thus, rather than the typical destabilizing role played by capital outﬂows during
ﬁnancial crises, petrodollar ﬂows became a source of stability for the U.S. The second phase
of the crisis is more conventional and began to emerge toward the end of the summer of
2008. It became apparent then that the ﬁnancial crisis would permeate the real economy
and sharply slow down global growth. This slowdown worked to reverse the tight commodity
market conditions required for a bubble to develop, ultimately destroying the commodity
bubble.
Let us now develop some of these steps, starting from the underlying structural force
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Figure 1: Global Imbalances (as a fraction of World GDP), 1990:1-2008:1. Data Sources: WDI,
WEO, IFS & OECD, authors’ calculations.
fueling U.S. asset appreciation. Figure 1 displays the main patterns of global imbalances since
1990. In particular, it shows the current account of the U.S., Europe & Japan, emerging Asia,
and oil producing economies, relative to world GDP.1 The facts are well-known: Starting in
1991, the U.S. current account deﬁcit worsened continuously, reaching 6.4 percent of U.S.
GDP in the fourth quarter of 2005, then stabilizing back to 5 percent of GDP by early 2008.
The counterpart of the U.S. deﬁcits, initially due to Japan and Europe, were bolstered by
emerging Asia and commodity producing countries after 1997.
In Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas (2008) we showed how this build-up in “global im-
balances” could be understood as the consequence of asymmetries in ﬁnancial development
and growth prospects across diﬀerent regions of the world. In particular, we argued that
the Emerging Market (EM) crises at the end of the 1990s, the subsequent rapid growth
of China and other East Asian economies, and the associated rise in commodity prices in
1The sample of European countries includes: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Nether-
lands, Spain, Denmark, Iceland, Sweden, and Switzerland. Oil producing countries include: Canada, Norway,
Mexico, Venezuela, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Nigeria, Kuwait, Libya, Oman and Bahrain. Asian countries
include: South Korea, China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and
Thailand.
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Figure 2: World and US Real Interest Rates, 1990:1-2008:2. Data Sources: IFS, WDI, OECD &
SPF, authors’ calculations. The world short real rate is a GDP-weighted of the 4-quarter average
ex-post 3-months Treasury Bill real rates for the G-7 countries.
recent years, reoriented capital ﬂows from emerging markets toward the U.S.. In eﬀect, EMs
and commodity producers in need of sound and liquid ﬁnancial instruments to store their
newfound wealth, turned to the U.S. ﬁnancial markets, perceived as uniquely positioned to
provide these ﬁnancial assets.2
As we explained then, a by-product of this reallocation of capital ﬂows was a necessary
decline in U.S. and world real interest rates and a boom in U.S. asset markets. Ex-ante real
interest rates on 10-year U.S. government bonds fell below 2% in 2002 (ﬁgure 2) while the rate
on a 30-year ﬁxed rate conventional mortgage reached 5.23 percent in June 2003 (ﬁgure 3),
with a 2.9 percent annual inﬂation. As foretold by then Governor Bernanke in his inﬂuential
‘Savings Glut’ speech (Bernanke (2005)), it is now apparent that this boom was located in
no small part in a rise in U.S. housing markets and the related markets for structured credit
instruments (ﬁgures 4 and 5). In the context of low real interest rates, U.S. households
were encouraged to take on more housing risk than they could bear, risks that magically
2In recent years, a signiﬁcant portion of the capital ﬂows from EM countries to the U.S. took the form of
oﬃcial reserve accumulation. The composition of capital ﬂows is not the focus of our analysis. Nonetheless,
we observe that, especially in the case of China, most of these reserves are indirectly held by local investors
through low-return sterilization bonds.
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Figure 3: Contract Rate on 30-Year, Fixed-Rate Conventional Home Mortgage Commitments,
1990:1-2008:2. Data Source: Federal Reserve Bank series H15.
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Figure 4: S&P Case Shiller Composite-10 Home Price Index (CPI-deﬂated) 1990M1-2008M8. 100
in January 2000. Data Source: Standard and Poors, IFS & Authors’ Calculations.
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Figure 5: Commercial Paper, Amount Outstanding, billions USD. 2003M1-2008M10. Data Source:
Federal Reserve Board.
disappeared from the mortgage-backed securities and other structured investment vehicles
whose supply exploded over the same period (ﬁgure 5). The catastrophic and systemic
failures of this originate-to-distribute model are now well-documented.3
By sometime in 2006, the appreciation in U.S. real estate prices came to a halt and the
U.S. current account deﬁcit began to turn around (see ﬁgures 1 and 4). Starting in earnest
in June 2007, with the bailout of two Bear Stearns’ funds that could not meet their margin
calls, the world economy entered, with a certain fracas, into a period of signiﬁcant global
adjustment. Within weeks, funding dried up for entire segments of the U.S. and international
banking sector, especially asset-backed commercial paper (see ﬁgure 5), leading to major
convulsions of credit and money markets, including the dramatic collapse and rescue of
several U.S. and European commercial and investment banking institutions. More than 12
months after the onset of the crisis, ﬁnancial markets appear nowhere near stabilized. In
fact, by the beginning of the summer of 2008, ﬁnancial distress in major players began to
accelerate, a process that started with the government rescue of the Government Sponsored
Enterprises (GSE) Fanny Mae and Freddy Mac in July and culminated with the failure of
3See Brunnermeier (forthcoming 2008) and Greenlaw, Hatzius, Kashyap and Shin (2008) for detailed and
recent accounts of the subprime crisis.
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Figure 6: U.S. Treasury and LIBOR-OIS Spread. Jan-2007 to Oct-2008. Data Sources: Morgan-
Market; Authors’ calculations.
Lehman Brothers on September 15. This was a watershed moment. Until then, the crisis had
been severe, but largely contained within the ﬁnancial sector of the economy. Following the
collapse of the GSEs and of the entire U.S. broker-dealer industry, the seizing of wholesale
money markets reached unprecedented proportions. Figure 6 decomposes the spread between
3-months LIBOR and 3-months Treasury yields (the TED spread) into a LIBOR-Overnight
Index Swap (OIS) spread (top part) that measures interbank credit risk, and a Treasury-OIS
spread (bottom part) that captures ﬂight to liquidity. In the weeks following the collapse of
Lehman Brothers, both components of the spread increased dramatically, with the Treasury-
OIS spread reaching 165bp on September 17 and the LIBOR-OIS spread reaching 365bp on
October 10. With credit markets on life support the crisis quickly spread to the rest of the
economy.
Most likely, the strong U.S. capital inﬂows of the last few years contributed to the sig-
niﬁcant weakening of U.S. credit markets. The eventual recognition of their degraded per-
formance was one of the triggers of the current crisis. However, this weakening is in itself
part of the endogenous response of U.S. ﬁnancial markets to world ﬁnancial conditions. In
eﬀect, U.S. assets became stretched by trying to accommodate the world’s excess demand
6for assets. Therein lies the structural problem. This chronic excess demand for assets de-
rives from ﬁnancial underdevelopment in emerging markets and most commodity producing
economies, rather than from macroeconomic imbalances. Excess asset demand leaves an
unmistakable signature in low real interest rates, which in turn provide a fertile ground for
bubbles to emerge. Thus an alternative –perhaps metaphoric– interpretation of the sequence
of events is that the bubble located in emerging markets during the 1990s migrated toward
the U.S. housing and credit markets (and the NASDAQ before that) following the EM crisis
and the coming on-line of capitalist China.4
With the U.S. ﬁnancial crisis, that bubble collapsed as well. Initially, the excess as-
set demand that produced it did not. Emerging Markets and commodity producers were,
more than ever, in search of investment opportunities. Witness the long list of sovereign
wealth funds and the ﬁnancial means at their disposal. According to Deutsche Bank (2007),
Sovereign Wealth Funds managed $3 trillion USD as of September 2007, and were expected
to manage an additional $7 trillion within the next ten years.5 Another bubble was likely
to appear as the endogenous response of a world economy that tried to increase the global
supply of ﬁnancial assets. We argue that it did so quickly, in the form of a commodity
bubble. Figure 7 reports the real price of a barrel of West Texas Intermediate (WTI) in 2008
U.S. dollars. Between June 2007 and June 2008, real crude prices increased by almost 100
percent. During the summer of 2008, however, as the ﬁnancial crisis spread and economic
growth started to decline, commodity prices suﬀered a dramatic collapse. Between July 2008
and October 2008, real crude prices declined by almost 53 percent, bringing them back to
their level of June 2007.6
Essentially, in the ﬁrst phase of the crisis the combination of a tight commodity market
and the decline in equilibrium real interest rates made it privately worthwhile to transform
commodities into an asset (or even a new bubble). The mechanism is related (but not
identical) to that in Hotelling (1931): Suﬃciently low real interest rates make inventory
4See Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2006) for a model of bubbles and capital ﬂows in emerging markets
based on ﬁnancial underdevelopment.
5These ﬁgures are being revised downward as a result of the brutal slowdown in world economic growth.
6This price pattern is quite general. It is apparent for energy commodities (coal, gasoline, heating oil), or
biofuels such as corn. It is also present for most metals (aluminum, lead, copper, gold and silver) with the
exception of zinc and nickel whose price peaked earlier in 2007. We ﬁnd it also for most food prices (wheat,
soybean, coﬀee, tea, cocoa, barley, rice, palm oil, groundnuts and rapeseed oil), less so for (sugar, cattle and
hog). Our model provides a broad brush to understand the general evolution of commodity prices. Yet,
individual commodities might also be aﬀected by other factors – supply disruptions, weather, commodity-
speciﬁc demand shocks. We also note that high energy prices generally push up food prices through higher
production costs, and stronger competition for acreage from biofuels
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Figure 7: Real Price of West Texas Intermediate barrel of oil, 2008 dollars. Jan-1970 to Oct-2008.
Data Sources: Global Financial Database & IFS; Authors’ calculations.
accumulation proﬁtable and drive up the price of exhaustible resources. However, in the
second phase the market-tightness precondition disappeared, which in turn destroyed the
asset-accumulation incentive behind the feverish rise in commodity prices, triggering the
collapse in these prices.
Figure 8 presents a scatter plot of crude oil prices against the S&P500 index from 2004
to 2008. The graph clearly illustrates the diﬀerent phases of the crisis. Prior to June 2007,
the correlation between oil and U.S. stock prices was positive. During the ﬁrst phase of the
crisis, from July 2007 to June 2008, the correlation is strong and negative. Finally, since July
2008, the correlation again becomes strong and positive. The negative correlation during
the ﬁrst phase of the crisis is especially interesting from our point of view. Purely demand
driven explanations of the surge in commodity prices would predict a positive correlation
between assets and commodity prices. Later in this paper we provide instrumental variables
evidence to support the claim that the negative correlation in this phase is not due to oil
shocks but due to the ﬁnancial mechanism we describe.
Let us now return to the implication of these developments for the global imbalances.
According to Caballero et al. (2008), the sharp contraction in U.S. asset supply caused by
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the subprime crisis should lower equilibrium interest rates and trigger a rebalancing away
from now ‘toxic’ U.S. assets.7 The resulting decline in U.S. wealth reduces domestic con-
sumption,and improves the trade balance and the current account. This is in line with what
we observed since June 2007: U.S. long real rates fell from 2.3 percent to 1.4 percent by
June 2008 (Figure 2). The current account (trade) deﬁcit improved from 5.6 (5.2) percent
of GDP in June 2007 to 5.0 (5.0) percent in June 2008.
While qualitatively correct, the initial response of the trade balance and the current
account was muted relative to what our basic view implies. That is, if the relative ﬁnancial
appeal of the U.S. is what is behind the initial imbalances, why didn’t the subprime crisis
did not lead to a sharper turn around in the U.S. current account? Again, we argue that the
answer lies in the endogenous response of commodity prices. Because commodity inventories
were initially very low, a by-product of the strong demand arising from the robust growth
of emerging economies, the net asset creation from the commodity mechanism is initially
small. In contrast, the strong impact of the price rise on the income of commodity-producing
economies leads to a sharp rise in their demand for store of values, which further depresses
7The model predicts a simultaneous move towards ‘safe’ US assets. This ﬂight-to-quality is an important
feature of our analysis.
9real interest rates and stabilizes capital outﬂows to the U.S. in the short run.8
In the second phase of the crisis, external imbalances may or may not increase. Two
oﬀsetting forces are at play. On the one hand, the decline in economic growth reduces
asset supply. This tends to depress interest rates and increase capital outﬂows to the US.
Simultaneously, the collapse in commodity prices makes commodity producers poorer, hence
reducing asset demand. For low levels of inventories, this second eﬀect may dominate so
that interest rates rise and external imbalances are reduced.
The rest of the paper provides a model and a quantitative assessment of the story and
mechanisms we just described. The model is based on Caballero et al. (2008) with com-
modities. It has two regions, U and M. We interpret U as the U.S. and M as the rest, with
an emphasis on emerging market economies and commodity producers. The model features
two goods: A non-storable good, X, produced by both countries and a storable commodity,
Z, that is only produced by M. The supply of X grows exogenously while the supply of Z
is constant. This is meant to capture the growing demand pressures on commodities that
arise from robust world economic growth. We set-up the model so that a bubble develops
initially in U. As discussed above, we interpret this bubble metaphorically as the extent to
which asset markets in U are stretched to provide ﬁnancial assets to the rest of the world.
With the bubble, the U.S. runs a larger current account deﬁcit (the external imbalances)
and world interest rates are low.
The original event in our model is the U.S. ﬁnancial crisis: The bubble bursts at t = 0,
leaving savers scrambling for alternative stores of values. The resulting decline in real interest
rates has two eﬀects. First, it increases the value of ‘good’ U assets. This translates into a
ﬂight-to-quality, from the bubble to the ‘good’ U asset. Second, and more importantly, it
triggers the commodity markets into action. As speculative hoarding takes place, the price of
commodities jumps. Per se, this increase in commodity prices results in a signiﬁcant wealth
transfer from U to M. But M needs good stores of value. Thus a signiﬁcant portion of that
newfound wealth ﬁnds its way back into U. The resulting capital inﬂows further boost the
value of the domestic asset and cushion the impact of the bubble’s burst. Eventually, and
gradually, the increase in asset supply due to commodity inventories pushes up interest rates,
which forces rebalancing in U. To capture the second phase of the crisis, we assume that
8The reader may wonder why the rise in the price of oil is not simply a transfer of income from oil
consumers to producers and hence has no impact on asset demand. The answer is in our choice of nu-
meraire, which is the non-commodity good. This will be clearer once we describe the model but, as with all
normalizations, it has no substantive implications.
10somewhere along this process, the ﬁnancial crisis compromises global growth. The decline
in global growth removes the asset market excess demand, which leads to a decumulation of
inventories and a rapid collapse in commodity prices, alongside with asset prices.
Before turning to the details, it is worth clarifying two modeling subtleties that are
important in interpreting our formal discussion. First, while the commodity side of our
model shares some of Hotelling (1931)’s seminal insights, ours does not rely on Hotelling’s
key stock constraint (exhaustible resource). Instead, in our context there is a ﬂow-extraction
constraint which is insuﬃcient to meet demand growth. This mismatch is the main factor
behind the structural trend in commodity prices. In this context, the subprime collapse
superimposes on the previous trend a speculative reason (in the precise sense of a rational
bubble) for price increases; and the collapse in global growth in the second phase of the crisis
damages the structural reason (the trend) supporting the bubble. Second, this speculative
factor raises the eﬀective opportunity cost of resource extraction for producers since there is
now an asset-opportunity-cost, as in Hotelling’s model, which reduces extraction incentives
for commodity producers. The latter response means that, in equilibrium, there need not
be any rise in measured inventories, and hence our allusion to inventories throughout this
paper includes previously unextracted commodities.
Section 1 describes the basic mechanism connecting the ﬁnancial crisis to commodity
prices. Section 2 focuses on long-run global imbalances, while section 3 discusses short-
run imbalances and presents some back-of-the-envelope estimates of the eﬀects we describe.
Section 4 calibrates the model and explores its dynamic implications. Section 5 presents
evidence supporting the speculative nature of the rise in oil prices following the subprime
crisis, and of the recent drop in these prices. Section 6 concludes. Most formal derivations
as well as explorations of some extensions of the model (such as the role of future markets
and inventory trends) are relegated to appendices.
1 Global Capital and Commodity Markets
1.1 The model for the world economy
Time evolves continuously. Inﬁnitesimal agents (traders) are born at a rate θ per unit of time
and die at the same rate; population mass is constant and equal to one. Agents receive some
endowment at birth, which, for simplicity, they save in its entirety until they die. Denote by
11Wt the savings accumulated by households at date t. In every period, aggregate consumption
Ct is then a constant fraction θ of these accumulated savings:9
Ct = θWt. (1)
Households consume a basket of two goods: an X-good (the numeraire) and a Z-good.
Intratemporal preferences over these two goods are of the constant-elasticity-of-substitution
(CES) type:
Ct =
 
C
(σ−1)/σ
X,t + α
1
σC
(σ−1)/σ
Z,t
 σ/(σ−1)
. (2)
σ > 0 is the elasticity of substitution while α > 0 controls the equilibrium share of expendi-
tures on the Z-good.
Given a relative price pt of the Z-good, households split their consumption between both
goods as follows:
CX,t =
θWt
1 + αp
1−σ
t
and CZ,t =
αp
−σ
t θWt
1 + αp
1−σ
t
. (3)
The X-good is a conventional non-storable good, while the Z-good is a storable commod-
ity. Denote by It ≥ 0 the outstanding inventories of the Z-good. Storing the commodity
imposes an iceberg storage cost d ≥ 0 per unit of time and good stored. Denote rt the
instantaneous interest rate (in terms of the X-good). By arbitrage, pt must satisfy:
˙ pt
pt
≤ rt + d, (4)
with equality if It > 0 or ˙ It > 0. This arbitrage equation is central to the analysis of storable
commodities, such as Hotelling (1931). It states that the capital gains on commodities
cannot exceed the interest rate, net of any convenience yield or carrying cost.
The endowment of the X-good, denoted Xt, grows at rate g > 0 over time. By contrast,
we assume that the endowment of the Z-good is constant through time: Zt = Z, which allows
us to capture the idea that demand pressures on commodities are growing over time.10
9As Caballero et al. (2008) show, this can be interpreted equivalently as log-preferences over consumption
streams.
10Note that our model diﬀers from Hotelling (1931)’s in that we replace his stock constraint with a
ﬂow constraint on commodity production. This has important implications later on since it allows us to
separate more cleanly the asset-aspect of commodities from their goods-aspect. Moreover, in our framework,
macroeconomic conditions determine whether one aspect or the other dominates in price-determination. See
Jovanovic (2007) for a Hotelling based model of bubbles in exhaustible resources.
12The Z-good is assumed to be noncapitalizable unless it is transformed into inventories
(below or above the ground). In contrast, a fraction δ of the X-good is capitalizable. We
capture this feature as follows. At every point in time, there is a number Xt of identical
trees with an aggregate market value of Vt. Each tree yields 1 unit of X-good, a fraction
δ of which is distributed to its current owners. Since the number of trees grows at rate g,
the total value of new trees is gVt per unit of time. The fraction of the output that is not
capitalized is distributed to newborns, as are the new trees. Hence, the total endowment
received by newborns per unit of time is composed of (1−δ)Xt units of the X-good, Z units
of the Z-good and gXt new trees. The value of this endowment is (1 − δ)Xt + ptZ + gVt.
The return on existing trees is the dividend price ratio δXt/Vt plus the capital gain
˙ Vt/Vt − g which, in equilibrium, must be equal to the instantaneous interest rate in the
economy, rt:
rtVt = δXt + ˙ Vt − gVt. (5)
In addition to the tree asset, some of our equilibria will exhibit rational bubbles, Bt,
which must satisfy the arbitrage condition:
˙ Bt = (rt + λ)Bt, (6)
where λ > 0 is the hazard that the bubble bursts in the next instant. For simplicity
we analyze the limit case as λ goes to zero and d > λ. These assumptions allow us to
approximate the solution with the perfect foresight case and to reduce the number of subcases
we need to discuss.
Savings decrease with withdrawals (deaths), and increase with the endowment allocated
to new generations and the return on accumulated savings:
˙ Wt = −θWt + (1 − δ)Xt + ptZ + gVt + rtWt. (7)
In equilibrium, savings must be equal to the value of all the assets in the economy:
Wt = Vt + ptIt + Bt. (8)
13Using (3) and imposing market clearing in the X-good market, we obtain:
θWt
1 + αp
1−σ
t
= Xt and
αp
−σ
t θWt
1 + αp
1−σ
t
= Z − ˙ It − dIt. (9)
In equilibrium, replacing (9) back into (7), yields the equilibrium interest rate (for the
case with inventories, i.e. max
 
It, ˙ It
 
> 0):
rt = θ
 
δ + g
Bt+ptIt
Xt
 
−
 
ptZ
Xt − αp
1−σ
t
 
1 + ασp
1−σ
t
+ ǫd. (10)
where ǫd is an expression that plays no role in our main discussion.11
The interest rises as θ rises because a higher θ increases consumption and reduces asset
demand. The two terms in parentheses in the numerator are central to our discussion below.
The ﬁrst of these terms represents asset supply: the interest rate rises with δ and with
Bt + ptIt because they increase asset supply. The second term represents the “petrodollar”
eﬀect and is present when inventories are being accumulated: When the price of commodities
rises, the income of oil producers rises more than the eﬀective income of oil-consumers falls.
This net income eﬀect lowers interest rates because it raises asset demand.
Later on we will see that for plausible parameter values, the asset demand eﬀect dominates
the asset supply eﬀect in the short run, and so that an increase in the price of oil puts
downward pressure on real interest rates. Since commodity prices also rise when interest
rates fall (see (4)), the interaction between commodity prices and real interet rates gives rise
to potentially large feedbacks.
1.2 The σ = 1 case
Although in practice the short run elasticity of demand for the Z-good is signiﬁcantly smaller
than one, it is useful to start with the case σ = 1 since it allows us to characterize explicitly
the main mechanisms at work. We simplify things further by studying the case where d
converges to zero (while preserving the assumption d > λ).
Assume momentarily that the equilibrium has neither inventories nor bubbles. Replacing
(9) back into (7) yields a reference interest rate, rref = θδ/(1 + α). Henceforth we shall
11ǫd ≡ −d(σ − 1)αp
1−σ
t /
 
1 + ασp
1−σ
t
 
.
14assume that ﬁnancial assets are suﬃciently scarce (δ low) for the economy to be dynamically
ineﬃcient (rref < g):
Assumption 1 Dynamically Ineﬃcient Economy: δ < g(1 + α)/θ
Bubbleless equilibrium. Suppose for now that there are no bubbles, then the equilibrium
must have inventories. To see this, note that if there are no inventories r = rref < g. But
in this case equation (9) requires pt = αXt/Z, so the price of commodities grows at a rate g
which exceeds the equilibrium interest rate. Thus, there is a clear incentive to accumulate
inventories, which is a contradiction of the no-inventories premise.
From (4) and (9), the dynamics of the economy can be summarized in a simple sytem
with variables It and qt ≡ pt/Xt:
 
˙ It = Z − αq
−1
t
˙ qt = (rt − g)qt
, (11)
where rt is given by:
rt = θ
δ + α − qt (Z − gIt)
1 + α
. (12)
Asymptotically, the level of inventories stabilizes at a strictly positive level which is propor-
tional to the degree of dynamic ineﬃciency in the economy:
lim
t→∞
It = ¯ I =
1 + α
αθg
 
g − r
ref 
Z > 0. (13)
The price pt of the Z-good grows at rate g and the interest rates rt converges to the growth
rate g of the X-good.
Figure 9 reports the phase diagram associated with (11). The dynamic system exhibits
the saddle-path property.12 This saddle-path is downward sloping: when inventories are
low (It < ¯ I), the price of commodities is high (qt > ¯ q ≡ α/Z) and decreasing (rt < g).
Conversely, when inventories are abundant (It > ¯ I), the price of commodities is low (qt < ¯ q)
and increasing (rt > g).
A key element of our model lies in the slope of this saddle-path. To understand why
12Figure 9 is drawn for the case where θδ/(1 + α) < g < θ(δ + α)/(1 + α), where the ﬁrst inequality is a
consequence of assumption 1. The case where g > θ(δ + α)/(1 + α) is similar and features also a downward
sloping saddle-path, but the ˙ q = 0 schedule is downward sloping.
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Figure 9: The Model with Inventories when σ = 1.
it is downward sloping, consider an initial inventory position I0 < ¯ I and suppose that the
price is such that the commodity market is initially in equilibrium at that inventory level
( ˙ I0 = 0,or q0 = ¯ q). This is point B1 on ﬁgure 9. It is immediate that the interest rate r0
that clears the asset markets at point B1 must be below the growth rate g. The economic
intuition is that at q = ¯ q, too few assets are created through inventories (whose value is
¯ qI0). Equilibrium on global asset markets then requires a low interest rate. But when
r0 < g, the (normalized) price of commodities declines over time, which increases demand
for commodities and reduces inventories ( ˙ I0 < 0). Instead, the equilibrium requires that the
price of commodities is initially suﬃciently high to depress the demand for commodities, and
allow inventory accumulation ( ˙ I0 > 0). Equivalently, the price of commodities needs to rise
suﬃciently to depress equilibrium interest rates and make inventory accumulation proﬁtable.
This is represented by point A in the ﬁgure. This high initial price depresses interest rates
below r0. Over time, since rt < g, (normalized) commodity prices decrease, which increases
demand for commodities and slows down inventory accumulation. The steady state is reached
at point C.
The price of commodities performs a dual role in the model with inventories: it inﬂuences
the demand for the Z-good on the spot market; and it inﬂuences the global supply of assets
in the economy (Vt + ptIt). As in traditional models of portfolio balance, it is the tension
16between these two functions that generates interesting dynamics.13
Bubbles. Now let us turn to the opposite extreme, where bubbles exist and do not vanish
asymptotically relative the size of the economy. In the limit, since we assumed d > λ, there
are no inventories. Without inventories, the Z-good is for consumption only, and its price
grows at rate g. The interest rate rt converges to g and the bubble converges to:
Bt ∼
t→∞
1 + α
θg
 
g − r
ref 
Xt. (14)
The size of the asymptotic bubble in (14) is the same as the size of the asymptotic
equilibrium inventories pI in the bubbleless equilibrium (13). In both cases, the endogenous
increase in asset supply is just suﬃcient to increase the equilibrium interest rate to g.
The No-Inventory Economy (a benchmark). In our model, the price of the Z-good
is both a relative price, and, when inventories are non-zero, an asset price. In order to
illustrate the importance of this dual role, we provide a benchmark-economy where the
inventory-channel is turned oﬀ. That is, we assume that storage costs are prohibitive (i.e.,
d is very large) so the Z-good cannot be stored.
This benchmark economy has two long run steady-states: a bubbly one and a bubble-
less one. The bubbly steady-state is exactly as above with the same equilibrium prices and
quantities. However, the bubbleless equilibrium is diﬀerent since inventories cannot be ac-
cumulated. In the bubbleless equilibrium, market clearing for the Z-good implies that pt
grows at rate g. Equilibrium in asset markets implies that the interest rate rt is equal to
rref < g.
Note that Assumption 1 implies that the interest rate rref in the bubbleless equilibrium
of the no-inventory economy is smaller than the interest rate g of the bubbleless equilibrium
of the economy with inventories. The reason for this diﬀerence is that total asset supply is
smaller in the economy without inventories. Note also that pt is the same in the bubbly equi-
librium and in the bubbleless equilibrium without inventories. That is, the price is entirely
determined by the relative endowments of the X-good and the Z-good and is completely
decoupled from the asset market.
13See Kouri (1982) and more recently Blanchard, Giavazzi and Sa (2005) for examples of the portfolio
balance models.
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Figure 10: A ‘Subprime Crisis’ at t = t0 when σ = 1.
1.3 The Financial Crash and Commodity Boom (Phase I)
Suppose now that a ‘subprime’ shock takes place. This can be interpreted as the realization
that ﬁnancial instruments are less sound than they were once perceived to be. It could result
from, inter alia, the realization that corporate governance is less benign than once thought
(excessive risk-taking and poor risk management by investment banks, or the realization
that securitization and certiﬁcation by rating agencies involve important agency problems);
a signiﬁcant loss of informed and intermediation capital (deleveraging of commercial and
investment banks hit by losses) and so on. All of these factors -and more- have been men-
tioned in the events surrounding the recent subprime crisis.14 We assume that this shock
is completely unanticipated, but this is not crucial to our analysis as long as there is some
degree of market incompleteness, preventing agents from fully hedging away.
In the model we capture this shock with a crash in the bubble B at date t0. The dynamics
that follow are described by those in the bubbleless system and are illustrated in Figure 10.
Right before the shock, the economy is at point A, with qt0 = ¯ q and no inventories (It0 = 0).
When the crisis erupts, the price of commodities jumps to point B, on the saddle-path. With
decreased demand in the spot market, the economy immediately begins to build inventories
(which could be kept under the ground). The price of commodities remains high until the
economy converges to the new steady state (point C).
14See Greenlaw et al. (2008) and Brunnermeier (forthcoming 2008).
18The collapse of the bubble reduces asset supply and leads to a drop in the interest rate.
Lower interest rates make more attractive the strategy of storing the Z-good to sell it in
the future, which validates the build-up in inventories. Higher commodity prices along the
transition are required to lower demand and restore equilibrium in the Z-good market. The
commodity price jumps at t = t0, and asymptotes from above to the same path as in the
pre-crash economy.
The interest rates initially drops by:
rt
+
0 − rt
−
0 = −g
Bt
−
0
Wt
−
0
−
θα
1 + α
 
pt
+
0
pt
−
0
− 1
 
< 0 (15)
and then converges smoothly back to the asymptotic level g. There are two terms on the
right hand side of (15). The ﬁrst “bubble-burst” term −gBt
−
0 /Wt
−
0 is directly due to the
collapse of the bubble. The second “commodity-price-jump” term follows from the increase
in the price of the Z-good, which raises the rate of wealth accumulation. Since inventories
are only gradually accumulated, an additional gap opens between asset supply and asset
demand, which requires a further decline in interest rates.
In the benchmark no-inventory economy, the normalized price of commodities stays con-
stant and equal to ¯ q, so the economy remains indeﬁnitely at point A in ﬁgure 10. Since the
price of commodities does not jump, the second term in equation (15) would equal 0, and
the interest rate drop would be entirely given by the bubble-burst term.15
Note that there is a strong ﬂight-to-quality feature in the model since both the value of
accumulated savings and the total value of assets are continuous at t = t0:
Wt
−
0 = (Vt
−
0 + Bt
−
0 ) = Wt
+
0 = Vt
+
0 =
1 + α
θ
Xt0.
This means that the decline in interest rates raises the value of the trees (the ‘good’
asset) enough to fully oﬀset the loss in value due to the crash in the bubble. Later on we
will show that when σ < 1, the decline in interest rate is more pronounced than in the σ = 1
case, which further raises the value of the remaining good assets.16
15We know from the previous analysis that the interest rate would drop to rref = δθ/(1 + α).
16Note that if we were to use a true CPI (rather than the price of good X) to deﬂate quantities, then
wealth would always drop in real terms after a crash. This alternative numeraire formulation, which we
develop in Appendix A.4, modiﬁes the “language” but none of our substantive conclusions.
191.4 The Growth Slowdown (Phase II)
Eventually, the ﬁnancial crisis starts to hurt global growth prospects. We capture this turn of
events by assuming that at t = t1, global growth slows down unexpectedly and permanently
from g to ˆ g < g. In the long run, the slowdown lowers the level of inventories ¯ I. In fact,
from (13) we see that if the growth slowdown is suﬃciently severe as to reverse assumption
1, the commodity bubble ultimately crashes and ¯ I = 0. We formalize this with the following
assumption.
Assumption 2 Severe Growth Slowdown: ˆ g < δθ/(1 + α)
Under assumption 2, inventories are not sustainable in the long run. The dynamics
that follow the growth slowdown are illustrated in Figure 11. At time t1, the economy is
at point D, with inventory levels It1 and a commodity price qt1. Following the shock, the
price of commodities needs to collapse, so as to pick up the slack from the decreased rate of
inventory accumulation. Equivalently, the collapse in commodity prices from D to E pushes
equilibrium interest rates to rt > ˆ g, making inventory accumulation less proﬁtable.17 Over
time, inventories converge to ¯ I = 0, while commodity prices increase back to ¯ q (point A),
and the interest rate converges to rref.
By constrast, in the no-inventory economy, the commodity price and the interest rate
would not be impacted at t = t1. The economy would remain indeﬁnitely at point A in
ﬁgure 11.
2 Global Imbalances in the Long Run
Let us now study global equilibrium in a world with two large regions, i = {U,M}. We
interpret region U as the US, with initially good but perhaps fragile ﬁnancial conditions,
17Note that while rt
+
1 > ˆ g, the interest rate can increase or decrease when the growth shock hits, depending
on the level of inventories It1. This is because a decrease in commodity prices reduces both asset supply (the
value of inventories decreases) and asset demand (the value of the ﬂow of Z-goods decreases). When It1 is
small, the asset supply shifts less than the asset demand curve, requiring an increase in the interest rate to
clear the asset market. We can compute the increase in interest rates,
rt
+
1 − rt
−
1 =
θ
1 + α
Z
Xt1
 
pt
−
1 − pt
+
1
 
+
θ
1 + α
Z
Xt1
 
pt
+
1 ˆ g − pt
−
1 g
 
It1
where the second term on the right hand side is negligible if It1 is small. Note that despite this potential
increase at impact, the interest rate eventually converges to a lower level since rref < g under assumption 1.
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Figure 11: A Growth Slowdown at t = t1 when σ = 1.
and region M as the set of emerging and commodity producing economies that oﬀset U.S.
external imbalances.
Each of the regions is described by the same setup as the world economy, with an instan-
taneous return from hoarding a unit of either tree, rt, which is common across both regions
and satisﬁes:
rtV
i
t = δX
i
t + ˙ V
i
t − gV
i
t (16)
where V i
t is the value of country i’s tree at time t. We assume initially that both regions
have common parameters g, δ and θ, but that the initial bubble is concentrated in the U
region. The latter captures the idea that the U region has more attractive assets than the
M region. Moreover, we assume that the Z-good is produced only in the M economy and
that the potential inventories are held in this region (perhaps under the ground, see later
discussion). These two features are all that diﬀerentiates the two regions, aside from scale.
Let W i
t denote the savings accumulated by agents in country i at date t. By analogy
with (7):
˙ W
i
t = −θW
i
t + (1 − δ)X
i
t + gV
i
t + rtW
i
t + 1{i=M}ptZt, (17)
where 1{i=M} is an indicator for country M. Adding (16) and (17) for U and M, the world
economy is exactly the one described in Section 1 with:
Wt = W
U
t + W
M
t ; Vt = V
U
t + V
M
t ; Xt = X
U
t + X
M
t ;
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Figure 12: The Metzler Diagram when σ = 1.
The current account CAU
t of country U represents the net accumulation of assets by
country U and is given by
CA
U
t = ˙ W
U
t − ˙ V
U
t − ˙ B
U
t . (18)
Let us start from the steady-state with bubbles and σ = 1 described in Section 1.2.
Figure 12 represents graphically the external equilibrium in U in a ‘Metzler-diagram’ (Metzler
(1960)). The curve labeled V U/XU represents the long run value of the U-tree, relative to
output. It is equal to δ/r and decreases with the interest rate r. The curve labeled W U/XU
represents the long run value of the savings to output ratio, as a function of the equilibrium
interest rate. It is equal to (1 − δ + gδ/r)/(θ + g − r). It decreases, then increases with r.18
Without bubbles or inventories, long run ﬁnancial autarky is achieved at point A with
r = δθ. Under ﬁnancial integration, but still without bubbles or inventories, the interest rate
is lower, at rref = δθ/(1 + α). The reason for the lower equilibrium interest rate is that a
larger fraction of global output is not capitalized when there are commodities. The lower
interest rate allows U to supply more assets to M and to run a current account deﬁcit that
is proportional to the distance between points B and C on ﬁgure 12.
18While the asset demand schedule W U/XU can be downward sloping, the gap between W U/XU and
V U/XU, equal to (1 − δθ/r)/(θ + g − r), is always increasing with the interest rate. The downward sloping
part of the W U/XU curve comes from the impact of interest rates on asset demand through the new trees
gV U. When g < δθ, the W U/XU curve has the shape shown in ﬁgure 12. When g > δθ, the asset and
demand curves cross on the downward sloping part of the asset demand curve W U/XU.
22In the presence of the bubble, the supply of assets increase from V U/XU = δ/g to
V U + B
XU =
δ
g
+
 
1 + α
θ
−
δ
g
 
Xt0
XU
t0
so as to eliminate the dynamic ineﬃciency of Assumption 1. The increase is such that
the world equilibrium interest rate increases from rrefto g. The current account deﬁcit in
the bubble equilibrium (proportional to the distance between points D and E) is always
larger than in the no-bubble & no inventories case (the distance between points B and C).19
The reason for this larger current account deﬁcit is that a disproportionate share of M’s
income is non-capitalizable (because their commodity income, pZ, is noncapitalizable unless
it is transformed into inventories), while U produces a disproportionate share of the global
assets.
2.1 Long-Run Imbalances with no Growth Slowdown
As before, the subprime shock takes place at t = t0. In the long run, the presence of
commodities leads to a larger global rebalancing in response to a subprime shock in the
U.S. (the U-region). Let’s consider ﬁrst what happens if there is no growth slowdown. In
this case, since the asymptotic interest rate in the absence of bubbles is still r = g, the
asymptotic current account deﬁcit of the U region following the collapse of the bubble is
smaller by exactly the size of the bubble:
CAU
t
XU
t
∼
t→∞
g
 
1
θ
−
δ
g
 
This asymptotic current account will be in deﬁcit if the degree of dynamic ineﬃciency in
the global economy is not too severe (δθ > g), as is assumed in Figure 12. Otherwise, the
buildup in inventories is signiﬁcant, which increases the supply of assets in the M region and
reduces its need to buy foreign assets for store of value.
This build-up of inventories implies that endogenous commodity prices lead to more
rebalancing in the long-run. The reason is that inventories contribute to increasing asset
19Indeed, the increase in the current account deﬁcit in the presence of the bubble can be computed as
CAU no-bubble − CAU =
g − rref
θ/(1 + α)
 
αg
(1 + α)(θ + g − rref)
+
X
XU − 1
 
which is always positive under Assumption 1.
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Figure 13: Long Run External Imbalances with Growth Slowdown when σ = 1.
supply in the M region, and hence endogenously reduce the eﬀective asymmetry between
the two regions. In terms of ﬁgure 12, the current account deﬁcit contracts from D − E to
D−F, as the bubble collapses and inventories are accumulated, while it would contract from
D − E to B − C in the benchmark no-inventory economy. Therefore, the inventory channel
unambiguously leads to more rebalancing in the long run. We will see in the next section
that this result can be overturned in the short run when σ < 1.
2.2 Long-Run Imbalances with a Growth Slowdown
Let us now reintroduce the slowdown in growth. Under assumption 2, the asymptotic interest
rate drops to rref. Figure 13 describes what happens to U′s asymptotic external imbalances
as growth declines. The asset demand curve rotates clockwise around point A, so that asset
demand decreases in the relevant range (r < δθ).
The asymptotic net foreign asset position NAU/XU =
 
W U − V U 
/XU can be read as
the distance G − C. Since there are no inventories and r = rref, it is the same as in the
benchmark no-inventory economy and worsens as the growth rate ˆ g declines. Further, this
asymptotic net foreign asset position is more negative with the growth slowdown (G − C)
than without (D−F). The reason is that lower growth eliminates the buildup in commodity
inventories and hence curtails the expansion in asset supply in the M region. The inventory
channel analyzed above, which reduces the asymetry between the two regions, is now damp-
24ened and the economy experiences less rebalancing in the long-run. However, since growth
is also slower in the former case, the asymptotic current account may or may not worsen
asymptotically with a growth slowdown.20
3 Global Imbalances in the Short Run
3.1 Phase I: The Financial Crisis
The behavior of the current account in the short run depends on the initial portfolios, the
degree of home portfolio bias, and the degree of substitution between the commodity and the
general consumption good. Following Caballero et al. (2008), we assume an extreme form of
home bias: at t = t0 all the assets held by the agents in the U region are U assets. Moreover,
we assume that domestic residents’ portfolios are proportional to the relative value of trees
and bubbles. The assumption of extreme portfolio home bias is a good approximation. As
of 2005, Sercu and Vanpee (2007) ﬁnd that the degree of home equity bias varies between
0.5 for Norway and 0.90 for Japan.21 The assumption that domestic residents’ portfolios
are proportional to the relative value of trees and bubbles implies that M has a signiﬁcant
exposure to U′s bubble asset. Again, this is a reasonable assumption. The onset of the U.S.
subprime crisis was marked by the failure of a small German bank, IKB, and a few months
later by the collapse of Northern Rock, a U.K. bank, highlighting the exposure of foreign
investors to tainted U.S. assets.22
Under these assumptions the degree of rebalancing on impact, CAU
t+
0
− CAU
t−
0
is given by
the sum of two terms: the adjustment in the trade balance XU
t − θW U
t , and the change in
payments on external debt, through asset valuations and interest rates. The adjustment in
payments on external debt is swamped by the adjustment in the trade balance when the
external debt is initially small, so we focus on the latter.It is always positive and given by:
TB
U
t
+
0 − TB
U
t
−
0 = −θ
 
W
U
t
+
0 − W
U
t
−
0
 
= θ t0−
 
Bt
−
0 + V
U
t
−
0 − V
U
t
+
0
 
, (19)
20The asymptotic current account deﬁcit is now:
CA
U
t
XU
t
∼
t→∞
−αˆ g
θ+ˆ g−rref and decreases with ˆ g.
21The degree of home equity bias is deﬁned as one minus the ratio of the share of foreign equities in the
domestic and world portfolios. It varies between zero (when the weight on foreign equities is given by their
relative market capitalization) and one (when investors hold no foreign equities). It has declined in recent
years, but remains very high for most countries.
22According to Beltran, Pounder and Thomas (2008), table 6, foreigners hold 39 percent –$2.3 trillion out
of $6 trillion– of outstanding ABS backed by U.S. assets, and about 16 percent of all U.S. credit market
instruments.
25where  t0− = W U
t
−
0
/
 
V U
t
−
0
+ Bt0−
 
represents the share invested in the domestic tree and the
domestic bubble before the crash.  t0− < 1 when U is a net debtor at time 0. At impact,
the direct eﬀect of the bubble crash is a reduction in wealth W U
t0, which lowers consumption
and improves the trade balance.23 Note that there is always less trade rebalancing in our
economy than in the benchmark no-inventory economy.24 The change in the trade balance
and the drop in W U
t
−
0
− W U
t
+
0
are exactly proportional to the change in the value of the U
assets, V U
t
−
0
+Bt0− −V U
t
+
0
. As a starting point, note that when σ = 1, the decline in asset prices
is exactly the same in the economy with and without endogenous commodity prices:
V
U
t
−
0 + Bt0− − V
U
t
+
0 = Bt0−
 
1 − x
U
t0
 
≥ 0 (20)
where xU
t0 = XU
t0/Xt0 is the output share of U. This result is particular to the case σ = 1
because the share of X-goods in consumption is invariant to the price pt of Z-goods.25
3.2 Phase II: The Growth Slowdown
Consider now the impact eﬀects of the growth slowdown shock. We maintain the assumption
of extreme home bias so that immediately before the growth slowdown shock hits, all of U’s
wealth is invested in U assets. The adjustment in the trade balance is always positive:
TB
U
t+
1 − TB
U
t−
1 = −θ
 
W
U
t+
1 − W
U
t−
1
 
= θ t1−
 
V
U
t−
1 − V
U
t+
1
 
,
where  t1− = W U
t−
1
/V U
t−
1
. The change in the value of U assets can be computed as above.
We show in Appendix A.1 that when It1 is small and σ = 1, the impact of the growth
slowdown on the trade balance is negligible. By contrast, when σ < 1, the decline in the
value of U assets is accentuated, and the trade balance improves at impact. We show in
23However, in equilibrium, the drop in wealth is dampened because interest rates plummet, raising the
value of the good U−asset and making up for part of the drop in wealth.
24In Appendix A.2, we show that the diﬀerence in trade rebalancing between these two economies is
strictly less than the direct eﬀect of the change in terms of trade resulting from speculation in commodities,
holding imports and exports constant. In other words, imported and exported quantities adjust by more in
the endogenous commodity price economy than in the no-inventory economy.
25In contrast,we show in Appendix A.1 that in the more realistic σ < 1 case, the increase in the price of
the U-assets in response to the subprime shock, V U
t
+
0
− V U
t
−
0
,is larger when commodity prices are endogenous
than when they are not. The reason for the larger increase in the value of U assets is that the share of
X-goods in value-added decreases, which raises asset demand relative to asset supply. As a result of this
gap, asset supply has to increase by more in equilibrium. This “petrodollar” channel will prove crucial later
on in our quantitative exercises. This eﬀect is absent in the no-inventory benchmark economy, which would
as a result experience a greater amount of rebalancing in the short run.
26the calibration section that most of this improvement originates in an improvement in the
commodity component of the trade balance.
3.3 Back-of-the-Envelope Calculations
This section gauges the order of magnitude of the eﬀects discussed above. We focus on
the impact eﬀect of the ﬁnancial crisis, which we can develop analytically, and present in
the next section discussion of the full dynamics. We ﬁnd from this ‘back-of-the-envelope’
exercise that our model can explain much of the observed decline in real rates and rise in
the price of oil in the ﬁrst phase of the ﬁnancial crisis, as well as the sharp collapse in the
price of oil in the second phase. The model also goes a long way in explaining why the U.S.
current account adjustment has been only minor so far, but it forecasts that the decline in
the price of oil will reduce the trade deﬁcit signiﬁcantly in the future.
Phase I: The ﬁnancial crisis. We begin with the impact of the crisis on interest rates.
According to Figure 2, real interest rates declined by about 1.75 percent between September
2006, when house prices start to decline and the current account turns around, and June
2008.26 With a unit elasticity, σ = 1, the change in interest rates is given by (15); when
the elasticity of substitution σ is smaller than 1, the drop in interest rates rt
+
0 −rt
−
0 can still
be expressed as the sum of two terms, a bubble-burst term reﬂecting the direct impact of
the collapse of the bubble on asset supply and a commodity-price jump term reﬂecting the
impact of the increase in the price of commodities on global asset supply and demand.27
The starting point in assessing the role of the two terms is an estimate of the size of the
perceived losses generated by the ﬁnancial crisis, in relation to the world’s ﬁnancial wealth:
Bt
−
0 /Wt
−
0 . Estimates of the perceived size of the initial collapse of the bubble are diﬃcult to
come by, and necessarily imprecise. A key issue is that the endogenous response of interest
rates oﬀsets the impact of the crash in Bt on global wealth.28 Empirically, this means that
the estimates of the size of the initial bubble that we obtain are likely to be downward biased.
Direct losses in U.S. mortgage markets alone are estimated in the vicinity of $500 billion
(Greenlaw et al. (2008)). In its April 2008 Global Financial Stability Report, the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund reaches a similar estimate of the aggregate losses in the U.S. residential
26The world short real rate dropped from 1.6 percent to -0.9 percent. The U.S. long real rate drops from
2.4 percent to 1.4 percent.
27See Appendix A.3 for an expression for the commodity-price jump-term.
28For instance, we have seen that in the case of a unit elasticity σ = 1, aggregate wealth remains unchanged.
27mortgage market (IMF (2008a)). Adding the potential losses to broader credit markets, the
IMF calculates aggregate losses from writedowns of U.S. loans and securitized assets of about
$945 billion.29 To these losses, one needs to add the declines in assets values generated by the
broad process of deleveraging and the associated contraction in lending across markets. For
instance, Greenlaw et al. (2008) estimate an overall $2.3 trillion contraction in intermediary
balance sheets. Moreover, mortgage market losses only reﬂect the increased rate of delin-
quencies on prime mortgages and commercial real estate (as well as the declining value of
foreclosed properties). To this, one needs to add the decline in housing wealth for residential
borrowers that remain in good standing on their mortgage. Estimates of the latter are signif-
icantly larger than the direct losses in mortgage markets. For instance, the Federal Reserve
estimates household’s housing wealth at $19.6 trillion dollars as of June 2006.30 According
to the Case-Shiller U.S. composite-10 Home Price index, U.S. housing prices declined 18
percent in nominal terms between September 2006 and June 2008 (see ﬁgure 4). Assuming
that this decline is across the board would wipe out at least an additional $3.5 trillion in
U.S. housing wealth alone.31
Adding these estimates yields a total loss in U.S. housing wealth and mortgage markets
in the range of $2 to $4 trillion. What is relevant in our calculation is the ratio of these
initial losses to the world’s ﬁnancial wealth Wt
−
0 . We construct a crude estimate of the latter
at the onset of the crisis as the sum of the U.S. household net worth of $51.7 trillion at
the end of 2005, and an estimate of the ﬁnancial wealth of the rest of the world of $80.7
trillion.32 This would give an initial size of the bubble between 1.5 and 3.0 percent of the
world’s ﬁnancial wealth. In what follows, we assume an initial bubble equal to 2 percent of
the world’s ﬁnancial wealth.
It is immediate that the bubble-burst term in equation (15), equal to −gBt
−
0 /Wt
−
0 , is
relatively small. With a growth rate around 3 percent, it is equal to only -0.06 percent. On
29In its October 2008 report, the IMF revised its estimate of U.S. declared losses on loans and securitized
assets to $1.4 trillion (IMF (2008b)).
30See table B.100 of the June 2008 release of the Flow of Funds.
31This is calculated under the extreme assumption that all mortgage market losses are housing market
losses. Of course, foreclosures and reposessions generate additional losses beyond the decline in housing
values.
32See Table B.100 of the June 2008 issue of the Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds Accounts for the US
ﬁgure. To obtain the estimate of the ﬁnancial wealth of the rest of the world in 2006, we calculate the ratio
of output to ﬁnancial wealth for the United States, the European Union and Japan between 1982 and 2004.
We ﬁnd a GDP-weighted average of 2.48 (see Caballero et al. (2008) for additional details). We apply this
ratio to the GDP of the rest of the world in 2005 and obtain $80.7 trillion. To the extent that many countries
are less ﬁnancially developed than the U.S., Europe or Japan, we are likely to overstate the world’s ﬁnancial
wealth. This would further bias downward our estimate of Bt0/Wt0.
28Change in interest rates, rt
+
0 − rt
−
0 :
pt
+
0 /pt
−
0 :
1 1.2 1.5 2 3
0.05 -2.22 -2.23 -2.25 -2.28 -2.37
0.1 -1.02 -1.04 -1.08 -1.16 -1.33
σ : 0.2 -0.44 -0.48 -0.55 -0.69 -1.00
0.5 -0.12 -0.21 -0.37 -0.66 -1.27
1 -0.06 -0.23 -0.50 -0.93 -1.80
Table 1: Decline in world interest rates (percent). The table reports the initial drop in interest rates
rt
+
0 − rt
−
0 . Source: Authors Calculations.
the other hand, the commodity-price jump term can be substantial. To see this, Table 1
reports estimates of the decline in r for diﬀerent values of the elasticity of substitution σ and
diﬀerent estimates of the increase in commodity prices. The calculation of the commodity-
price-jump term requires an estimate of average expenditure share of commodities, szt
−
0 . In
the table, we assume that szt−
0 = 0.04 percent, which corresponds to the average share of oil
expenditures in world GDP in 2005 and 2006.33
Between September 2006 and June 2008 the real price of a barrel of West Texas Interme-
diate increased from $68.5 to $142.3 in constant 2008 prices (see Figure 7). Interpreting this
surge as the direct eﬀects of the crisis yields pt
+
0 /pt
−
0 = 2.08. The associated decrease in real
interest rates in table 1 is consistent with what we see in the data. For a realistically low
level of the short-term price elasticity of demand σ = 0.1, we ﬁnd a decline in interest rates of
1.16 percent, smaller than the 1.75 percent observed over that period, but much larger than
the 0.06 percent decline associated with the direct eﬀect of the collapse of the bubble. Most
of the decline in interest rates comes from the indirect eﬀect of higher commodity prices,
hinting that the endogenous response of commodity prices to the subprime crisis is critical
in understanding the global macroeconomic environment.
We now turn to the eﬀect of the crash on commodity prices. We can compute the decline
in U′s ﬁnancial wealth and ﬁnd an expression for the jump in commodity prices as a function
33According to the Energy Information Administration (Table 2.4, World Petroleum Demand), world
demand for oil in 2005 was 83,646 thousand barrels per day. With a WTI price of the barrel equal to
$56.64 dollars, this corresponds to $1.7 trillion, or 3.79 percent of world GDP. In 2006, the share of oil in
expenditures was 4.16 percent. The remaining parameters will be discussed in more detail in Section 4.2.
29Change in commodity prices, pt
+
0 /pt
−
0 :
Bt
−
0 /Wt
−
0 (percent)
1 2 3 4 5
0.05 1.11 1.91 2.73 3.57 4.42
σ : 0.1 1.11 1.98 2.89 3.83 4.80
0.2 1.13 2.16 3.30 4.53 5.83
0.5 1.21 3.42 6.76 11.22 16.81
Table 2: The eﬀect of the subprime crisis on commodity prices. The table reports the initial increase in
the price of commodities pt
+
0 /pt
−
0 . Source: Authors Calculations.
of the decline in U′s wealth and the size of the original collapse of the bubble:34
pt
+
0
pt
−
0
=
 
1 +
W U
t
+
0
− W U
t
−
0
XU
t0
θ
 t
−
0
1 − szt
−
0
szt
−
0
+
1
szt
−
0
 
1
xU
t0
− 1
  Bt
−
0
Wt
−
0
 1/(1−σ)
. (21)
We already have an estimate for Bt
−
0 /Wt
−
0 and szt
−
0 . We estimate the decline in U.S.
ﬁnancial wealth W U
t
+
0
− W U
t
−
0
from the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts. Between
June 2007 and March 2008, U.S. households ﬁnancial wealth declined $1.65 trillion, or 12
percent of output.35 Next, we construct an estimate of  t−
0 , the share of domestic ﬁnancial
wealth invested in the domestic tree and the domestic bubble before the crash. In 2005, the
net foreign liabilities of the U.S. amounted to $1.85 trillion, or 15 percent of U.S. GDP.36
This corresponds to
 
W U
t
−
0
− V U
t
−
0
− Bt
−
0
 
/XU
t0. Substituting the expression for  t
−
0 , and using
the fact that W U
t
−
0
/XU
t
−
0
= 4.16, we obtain  t
−
0 = 0.96.37 Finally, we set the ratio of U.S. to
world output in 2005 at approximately 0.25.38 Table 2 reports estimates of the increase in
commodity prices as a function of the elasticity σ and the size of the initial bubble collapse
Bt
−
0 /Wt
−
0 .
The results in Table 2 support our view that the collapse in the U.S. housing market
and the contraction in credit markets played a signiﬁcant role in explaining the surge in
34See Appendix A.1.
35See Table B.100 of the June 2008 Federal Reserve Flow of Funds estimates. Households net worth was
$57.6 trillion in June 2007 at the onset of the crisis and only $55.9 trillion in March 2008.
36From Table 2 of the BEA’s International Investment Position. The net asset position is estimated at
market value.
37This represents an overestimate of the share of U.S. assets held by U.S. investors since we assume an
extreme form of home bias.
38US GDP in 2005 was $12.4 trillion, while the world’s GDP was about $45 trillion. While the theoretical
model refers only to U and M, in this back of the envelope exercise and the simulations that follow, it is
natural to include other countries as part of M.
30Change in the Trade Balance,
 
TBU
t
+
0
− TBU
t
−
0
 
/XU
t0 (percent):
Bt−
0 /Wt−
0 (percent):
1 2 3 4 5
1 3.01 6.02 9.04 12.05 15.06
1.2 2.30 5.31 8.32 11.33 14.34
pt+
0 /pt−
0 : 1.5 1.24 4.26 7.27 10.28 13.29
2 -0.47 2.55 5.56 8.57 11.58
3 -3.77 -0.75 2.26 5.27 8.28
Table 3: The eﬀect of the subprime crisis on the trade balance (percent). The table reports the initial
change in the trade balance relative to output,
 
TBU
t
+
0
− TBU
t
−
0
 
/XU
t0. Source: Authors Calculations.
commodity prices that followed the subprime crisis. We ﬁnd that, for our benchmark estimate
of the size of the bubble of 2 percent, commodity prices increase by 98 percent, when the
short run elasticity of substitution equals 0.1, which is very close to the 108 percent observed
in the data. Recall that without an asset-channel (no-inventories benchmark), commodity
prices would not jump when the crisis occurs.
Turning to the external accounts, between September 2006 and June 2008, the U.S.
trade deﬁcit on goods and services improved from $793 billion to $710 billion (annualized),
an improvement that represents 1.02 percent of U.S. GDP.39 Can the model explain this very
limited rebalancing? We answer this question by rewriting the trade balance equation (19)
as:
TBU
t
+
0
− TBU
t
−
0
XU
t0
=
 t
−
0
1 − szt
−
0


Bt
−
0
Wt
−
0
 
1
xU
t0
− 1
 
− szt
−
0


 
pt
+
0
pt
−
0
 1−σ
− 1




The ﬁrst term inside the brackets represents the direct impact of the collapse of the bubble
on the trade balance. It contributes positively to global rebalancing. The second term reﬂects
the contribution of commodity prices. Table 3 reports the sum of the direct and indirect
impacts of the subprime crisis on the trade balance as a function of the commodity price
surge pt
+
0 /pt
−
0 and the size of the initial bubble Bt
−
0 /Wt
−
0 for an elasticity of substitution σ
equal to 0.1.
The ﬁrst line of the table reports the change in the trade balance in the benchmark no-
inventory economy (which coincides with the direct eﬀect). We ﬁnd a large and implausible
improvement in the trade balance. For instance, for an initial bubble equal to 2 percent of
world ﬁnancial wealth, the no-inventory economy predicts a 6.02 percent improvement in
39See the Bureau of Economic Analysis’s National Income Accounts, Table 4.1.
31Change in commodity prices, pt
+
1 /pt
−
1 :  
W U
t
+
1
− W U
t
−
1
 
/XU
t1 (percent):
-0.05 -0.10 -0.15 -0.17
0.05 0.72 0.44 0.17 0.07
σ : 0.1 0.70 0.42 0.16 0.06
0.2 0.67 0.38 0.12 0.04
0.5 0.53 0.21 0.03 0.01
Table 4: The eﬀect of the growth slowdown on commodity prices. The table reports the drop in the
price of commodities pt
+
1 /pt
−
1 for diﬀerent values of the decline in US ﬁnancial wealths. Source: Authors
Calculations.
the trade balance relative to output. This is a far cry from the 1.02 percent observed in the
data. Again, once we introduce the “petrodollar” channel, the required rebalancing drops
signiﬁcantly. For instance, the trade balance improves ‘only’ by 2.55 percent, instead of
6.02 percent when commodity prices double. If instead, we consider a tripling of commodity
prices, or a smaller initial bubble collapse, it is possible for the trade balance to worsen on
impact. While our preferred numbers are on the high side (2.5 percent against 1.02), it is
apparent that the model has the capacity to rationalize the very limited global rebalancing
that we are witnessing.40
All in all, we conclude that the model is in the right ballpark and can account for the
broad features of the global economy in the ﬁrst phase of the crisis.
Phase II: The growth slowdown. We now ask whether the model can account for
the broad features of the data following the slowdown in economic activity. In real terms,
between July and November 2008, oil prices declined by 53 percent (see ﬁgure 7). We can
use (21) to write the change in commodity prices as:
pt
+
1
pt−
1
=
 
1 +
W U
t
+
1
− W U
t
−
1
XU
t1
θ
 t−
1
1 − szt
−
1
szt−
1
 1/(1−σ)
. (22)
The change in commodity prices is a function of the drop in U’s ﬁnancial wealth. Reasonable
estimates of the ﬁnancial losses incurred since July 2008 are not available yet. Instead, table
4 reports predicted declines for a range of estimates of
 
W U
t
+
1
− W U
t
−
1
 
/XU
t1 and diﬀerent values
of the short run demand elasticity for commodities.
40Calculations for the current account are very similar since when  t
−
0 is close to 1, interest payments
remain small.
32Change in the Trade Balance  
W U
t
+
1
− W U
t
−
1
 
/XU
t1 (percent):
-0.05 -0.1 -0.15 -0.17  
TBU
t
+
1
− TBU
t
−
1
 
/XU
t1 (percent): 1.09 2.18 3.27 3.70
Table 5: The eﬀect of a growth slowdown on the trade balance (percent). The table reports the initial
change in the trade balance relative to output,
 
TBU
t
+
1
− TBU
t
−
1
 
/XU
t1. Source: Authors Calculations.
It is immediate that commodity prices are extremely sensitive to the drop in ﬁnancial
wealth. For σ = 0.1, a modest decline in U.S. ﬁnancial wealth representing 10% of output
triggers a staggering 58 percent (0.42-1) decline in commodity prices. This is remarkably
close to the 53 percent decline observed in the data.
Table 5 reports the predicted change in the trade balance as a function of the decline
in U.S. ﬁnancial wealth. Since TBU = XU − θW U, this calculation is independent from σ.
This part of the analysis is necessarily more speculative. It indicates that the model predicts
a signiﬁcant rebalancing of the trade balance, equal to about 2.2 percent of output, as a
consequence of the growth slowdown.
4 Calibration and Dynamics
We now turn to the analysis of full general equilibrium dynamic simulations. We begin with
a discussion of plausible short run and long run elasticities of demand for commodities. We
then present the results from dynamic simulations of the ﬁnancial crisis with and without
growth slowdown.
4.1 Short and Long Run Elasticity
A key parameter of our model is the elasticity of substitution σ. Nordhaus (1980) ﬁnds
low ‘apparent’ short run price elasticities of demand, around 0.3, at the time of the 1973
oil price shock. Long run elasticities are typically higher since it takes time to substitute
away from energy-intensive technology. Nordhaus (1980) notes that for many components
of the physical capital stock, energy-substitution is only possible when the existing capital is
scrapped. In the transportation sector for instance, in which energy consumption depends
33in large part on the fuel eﬃciency of the outstanding stock of vehicles, energy consumption
responds gradually as old vehicles are slowly replaced with more fuel eﬃcient ones. Similarly,
in the case of electricity generation, there is almost no possibility for substitution in the short
run. In the long run, on the other hand, electricity generation can switch to other methods
of production such as nuclear or wind power generation.
More recent studies conﬁrm the ‘crude’ estimates in Nordhaus (1980) for the short run
while ﬁnding higher long run estimates.41 The typical estimates for short run price elasticities
vary between 0.1 and 0.3 while long run estimates vary between 0.4 and 1.42
Table 6 provides an update on Nordhaus (1980)’s apparent price elasticity estimates
around the recent increase in oil prices. It reports recent data on U.S. petroleum consumption
and prices before and after 2003, where the break in oil prices is apparent in ﬁgure 7. Between
2003 and 2007 petroleum prices increased by 8.55 percent per year, a sharp break from the
1.44 percent annual increase between 1988 and 2003. Nevertheless, the growth in demand
for petroleum products slowed only from 0.84 percent to 0.61 percent. The ‘apparent’ price
elasticity is calculated as in Nordhaus (1980), under the assumption of a unit elasticity of
petroleum product demand to GDP, as the (opposite of the) percentage slowdown in energy
demand corrected for the percentage change in real output growth, divided by the percentage
acceleration in prices.43 We obtain an estimate of 0.04, on the low end of available empirical
estimates.44 This is consistent with recent empirical estimates that ﬁnd an even smaller
short run price elasticity now than in the 1970s.45
A simple way of capturing this time variation in σ is to assume that the elasticity of
substitution remains signiﬁcantly smaller than one until the share of expenditures on the
Z-good reaches a certain exogenous level ¯ sz. When that level is reached, we assume that the
elasticity of substitution becomes equal to 1. This transition is fully anticipated by economic
agents. Continuity of the demand schedule also requires that α diﬀer as we transition from
41See Roy, Sanstad, Sathaye and Khaddaria (2006) or Dahl and Sterner (1991) for an older survey.
42See Hamilton (2008) for a recent discussion of crude oil prices, and the references therein.
43The income elasticity of petroleum demand is largely irrelevant in these calculations since output growth
was essentially the same over both subperiods. The income elasticity of demand of industrial countries
has declined signiﬁcantly since the oil price shocks of the 1970s and is now closer to 0.5. However, the
income elasticity of emerging and oil producing countries appears to be much closer or above unity. See
Gately and Huntington (2002) and the discussion in Hamilton (2008).
44Interestingly, the same (unreported) calculations for residential demand for petroleum products yields
a much larger apparent elasticity, at 0.78. The price elasticity is lowest for the industrial and transport
sectors, close to 0.
45Hughes, Knittel and Sperling (2008) ﬁnd a short run price elasticity between 0.03 and 0.08 between 2001
and 2006.
34U.S. Petroleum Demand and Apparent Price Elasticities
1988-2003 2003-07
Growth in real GDP (percent) 2.83 2.90
Growth in real petroleum product prices (percent) 1.44 8.55
Growth in real petroleum product demand (percent) 0.84 0.61
Apparent price elasticity 0.04
Table 6: U.S. Petroleum Demand and Apparent Price Elasticity. Source: Annual Energy Review, EIA,
Tables 1.5, 3.1, 3.4, Monthly Energy Review, EIA, Tables 2.1-2.6. Consumer Price Estimate for Petroleum
before 2005; Fossil Fuel Composite Price after 2005. All growth rates are compound annual averages. The
apparent elasticity is calculated under the assumption of a unit sectoral elasticity with respect to GDP.
σ < 1 to σ = 1.46 We denote α′ the preference parameter after the switch to σ = 1.
4.2 The Dynamic System and the U.S. Financial Shock.
We now characterize the full dynamic path in response to a U.S. ﬁnancial collapse. We
start the economy on the dynamic path of the bubble equilibrium with σ < 1, and a given
level of global imbalances. At t = t0, the bubble collapses and the economy jumps to
the dynamic path of the bubbleless equilibrium. We refer the reader to appendix B for
a complete exposition of the dynamic system and the transitions that occur between the
diﬀerent regimes.
The calibration of the dynamic path requires that we provide values for the following
parameters: the capitalization ratio δ, the growth rate of the economy g, the relative size of
U and M, the elasticity of substitution σ, the propensity to consume out of ﬁnancial wealth
θ as well as the share of commodity expenditures ¯ sz when the elasticity of substitution
becomes unitary. We adopt a mixed approach, setting the value of some parameters based
on plausible values, and calibrating others so as to reproduce key features of the data.
We start by setting the growth rate of the X-good to g = 0.03, which is close to the
real output growth rate in the U.S. between 1950 and 2007 (3.28%). As discussed above,
we assume that U represents a quarter of the world’s output. We set the elasticity of
substitution to σ = 0.3. This is signiﬁcantly larger than the apparent elasticity estimate
in Table 6. Nonetheless, as argued above, it is well within the range of estimates in the
46To see this, suppose that the transition occurs at some time T. Aggregate demand for good X right
before T is given by WT − =
 
1 + αp
1−σ
T
 
XT. Right after the switch, it is equal to WT + = (1 + α′)XT.
Continuity of commodity prices and wealth requires αp
1−σ
T = α′.
35empirical literature. Furthermore, this value of σ produces realistic levels of adjustment
in commodity prices in the model. It also implies that the price of commodities increases
initially at g/σ = 10% in the equilibrium with bubble, accounting for some of the rapid
increase in commodity prices observed before the U.S. ﬁnancial crisis.
We set ¯ sz = 0.1, so that the long run model kicks in when the expenditure share of
commodities reaches 10 percent. This seems a reasonably high value. In the data, the share
of oil in world output reached 4.16 percent in 2006, up from 1.29 percent in 1998. In the
simulation, it would take around 10 years before the expenditure share reaches 10 percent.
This yields α′ = 11.11%. Finally, we set the value of the world capitalization index δ to 0.15,
which corresponds to about half of the share of capital in national accounts. As discussed
in Caballero et al. (2008), δ should be substantially lower than the capital share since many
forms of capital do not generate capitalizable streams of revenue.47 We then calibrate each
countries’ δ so as to stabilize global imbalances before the crisis erupts. We obtain δ
U = 0.144
and δ
M = 0.1520.48
The two remaining parameters to calibrate are θ and α. We set their value so as to control
(a) the size of the initial bubble relative to aggregate wealth at t = 0, B0/W0 = β0; and
(b) the limit size of the bubble that would emerge in the bubbly equilibrium under σ = 1,
β1 ≡ limt→∞ Bt/Wt. From equation (B.1), we obtain limt→∞ Bt/Wt = 1−δθ/g(1 + α′). For
given values of β0 and β1, we infer back the corresponding values of θ and α.
In practice, we set β0 = 0.02, so that the collapse of the bubble represents roughly 2%
of world’s wealth, as estimated in the previous section. We set β1 = 1.01β0, so that the
economy is not far from its long run steady state when the bubble collapses (this ensures
that the share of commodities in expenditures is not too small). We obtain θ = 0.22 and
α = 0.40. We view these values as plausible. As a point of reference, Caballero et al. (2008)
computed a value of θ = 0.25, using data on U.S. household sector net worth and U.S. GDP
(θ can be interpreted as the output to ﬁnancial wealth ratio). These values imply that the
economy is slightly dynamically ineﬃcient since δθ/(1 + α′) = 2.94% < g = 3%. Finally, we
set η = −0.15, in line with estimates of the U.S. net external debt position in 2006. Table 7
summarizes all the parameter values.
47Caballero et al. (2008) assumed δ = 0.12. The results are largely unchanged with δ = 0.12.
48While the calibration sets δ
U slightly lower than δ
M, the ‘perceived’ capitalization index in U in presence
of the bubble B is much larger, equal to ˆ δ
U
=
 
δ −
 
1 − xU
t0
 
δ
M
 
/xU
t0 = 0.156. In that sense, the calibration
is ‘extreme’ in that it assumes that U does not have any fundamental advantage in supplying stores of value.
36Main Parameters
Parameter g σ Xu/X ¯ sz δ β0 β1 η
Value 0.03 0.3 0.25 0.1 0.15 2% 2.02% -0.15
Inferred Parameters
Parameter α θ δ
U δ
M
Value 0.40 0.22 0.144 0.152
Table 7: Main Parameters. See text for description.
Figure 14 reports the simulation obtained with these parameter values. Before the crisis,
the real interest rate is slightly above 3.4% and increasing, commodity prices (normalized)
are equal to their steady state value ˆ q ≡ (α/Z)
1/σ , while both the trade balance and current
account are in deﬁcit and improving (-3.5% and -4% of output, respectively).
At t = 0, the ﬁnancial crisis hits, wiping out 2% of aggregate ﬁnancial wealth. The
response of interest rates is quite stark (panel A): they drop from about 3.5 percent to
2.7 percent. This decline in interest rates is much larger than the one obtained in the
benchmark economy (the dashed line in panel A), where the decline is a mere 6 basis points.
The fall in interest rates in our economy is strong enough to trigger inventory accumulation.
As panel B shows, the normalized price of commodities ˆ qt = pt/X
1/σ
t jumps 2.3 times and
gradually converges back over the next 12 years. By contrast, in the benchmark economy,
the (normalized) price of commodities remains unchanged and equal to ˆ q.49 The jump in
prices lowers the demand for commodities and allows inventory accumulation. We ﬁnd that,
starting from It0 = 0, inventories rise relatively slowly: it takes 12 years before their market
value pI peaks at 3.2% of world ﬁnancial wealth. In the initial periods after the shock, in
particular, inventories remain very low, not contributing much to the global supply of assets.
Panel D reports the current account relative to output in our economy and the benchmark
economy. In both cases, the current account improves as a result of the collapse of the
bubble. However, as conjectured in the previous section, the rebalancing is much smaller in
the economy with inventories. In the benchmark economy, the current account jumps from
-4% to 2%, an instant rebalancing of 6% of GDP. This is not surprising, given the fact that
the bubble is located in the US: the reduction in asset supply leads agents to move part of
49This still implies that in the benchmark economy pt increases at the rate g/σ, faster than the rate of
economic growth.
37Change in U.S. Trade Balance, 1980-1989 and 1999-2008
percent of GDP 1980-1987 1987-1989 1999-2006 2006-2008
Change in the trade balance: -2.5 1.5 -2.8 0.8
of which:
change in non-oil BGS: -4.4 1.5 -1.4 1.5
change in oil balance: 1.9 0.0 -1.4 -0.7
Table 8: Change in the US Trade Balance, 1980-1989and 1999-2008. Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis.
their ﬁnancial investments to M. By contrast, in our economy, the rebalancing is ‘only’ from
-4% to -1.4%. As we discussed earlier, this is larger than the rebalancing observed in the
data, but of a similar order of magnitude.
Eventually, the rebalancing must become larger in our economy, with a long run current
account deﬁcit of -0.6% against -0.9% in the benchmark no-inventory economy. Nevertheless,
the role of commodities is to stabilize capital outﬂows for the ﬁrst four years after the initial
shock. Panel E shows that the implications for the trade balance are very similar, as discussed
earlier. Panel F further decomposes the trade balance into its non-commodity component
(XU
t −θW U
t /
 
1 + αp
1−σ
t
 
) and its commodity component (−αp
1−σ
t θW U
t /
 
1 + αp
1−σ
t
 
). Un-
derlying the muted response of the trade balance, both the commodity and non-commodity
balances adjust sharply. The commodity balance goes from -4.6% to -7.9% of output, while
the non-commodity balance jumps from 1.0% to 6.9% of output.
This asymmetric response of the commodity and non-commodity component of the trade
balance is consistent with the empirical evidence. Table 8 reports the change in the U.S.
trade balance during the last two rebalancing episodes: 1987-1989 and 2006-2008.50
The table shows that the recent improvement in the U.S. trade balance comes entirely
from the non-oil component, which improved more than 1.5 percent of GDP. By contrast,
the oil balance worsened by 0.7 percent of GDP. Comparing this rebalancing episode with
the previous episode, centered around 1987, it is striking to note that oil prices played no role
in attenuating the external rebalancing then: the deﬁcit of the oil balance did not change
between 1987 and 1989.
50Milesi-Ferretti (2008) presents additional evidence on the contrast between the two episodes.
38Figure 14: The Dynamic Response to the Subprime Crisis. Short Run and Long Run Responses
without Growth Slowdown. See text for description. Authors’ Calculations.
394.3 The Dynamic System and a Global Slowdown
The preceding results account for the negative correlation between U.S. ﬁnancial assets and
commodity prices that emerged in the ﬁrst phase the U.S. ﬁnancial crisis. Starting in July
2008, however, commodity prices retreated dramatically. Bad news for commodities was also
bad news for U.S. and world ﬁnancial markets.
Of course, this global collapse has many causes and a host of overshooting mechanisms
are at work, from balance sheet multipliers, to margin calls, to Knightian Uncertainty that
contribute to the overall process of deleveraging. Our framework is not suited to address
the role of each these factors. Instead, we emphasize here the dramatic impact of a global
economic slowdown. To do so, we re-calibrate our model assuming that a moderate economic
slowdown –from 3% to 2% annual output growth– takes place unexpectedly one year after
the beginning of the U.S. ﬁnancial crisis.
This moderate decline in global growth is suﬃciently large to ensure that assumption 2 is
satisﬁed, so that the global asset market tightness is removed. Figure 15 presents the results.
In each panel, the solid line reports the simulation with growth slowdown while the dashed
line reports the simulation from ﬁgure 14, without a growth slowdown. The collapse in global
growth t = 1, has dramatic consequences on asset and commodity prices. First, lower growth
reduces asset values. In the short run, however, it leads to an even larger decline in asset
demand. The result is an increase in interest rates (panel A) and a decline in asset prices
(panel F).51 This decline in asset demand arises from the sudden decline in commodity
prices (panel B) that makes commodity producers poorer. As discussed previously, this
collapse in commodity prices arises from a downward adjustment in the sustainable long run
equilibrium inventories (panel C). The growth slowdown eliminates the dynamic ineﬃciency
of the economy and thus the need to hold inventories in the long run. Inventory holders
immediately reduce the rate of accumulation of inventories, which leads to a collapse in the
price of commodities. As before, the decline in commodity prices is reinforced by the short
run increase in interest rates that makes commodity accumulation less proﬁtable.
The impact on external imbalances is also interesting. While the previous discussion
indicated that external imbalances could increase or decrease when growth slows down,
we ﬁnd that for these parameter values, the decline in commodity prices accelerates the
process of global rebalancing (panel D), largely through an improvement in the commodity
51Panel F reports the total value of U assets – including the bubble for t ≤ 0– in the case with (solid line)
and without (dashed line) growth slowdown. It also reports the value of the good U asset in the case with
growth slowdown (dot-dashed line).
40component of the trade balance (panel E).
The growth slowdown generates a pattern of positive comovements for asset prices and
commodities that closely matches what the world economy experienced since July 2008. In
our framework, the decline in global economic growth reduces the size or even eliminates
the bubble by reducing global asset demand. However, it is important to consider here that
this experiment assumes that the growth slowdown is permanent, a situation that is highly
unlikely. Once real economic conditions recover, our model predicts that asset demand will
rise back, recreating the chronic shortage of assets, and the cycle will start again...
5 Inventories, Oil Prices, and Asset Supply: Some Ev-
idence
5.1 Inventories
One objection to stories like ours, where asset-demand for oil plays an important role in price
determination, is that measured oil inventory levels did not rise during the recent price spike.
OECD petroleum inventories increased from 3743 million barrels (mb) in 2000 to 4082mb
in 2008. Yet, this increase mostly occurred between 2000 and 2006. After the onset of the
subprime crisis, OECD petroleum inventories declined from 4248mb to 4082mb across the
board.52
Yet, there are at least two reasons why the absence of a rise in measured inventories need
not be a serious concern. First, observed inventories are the result of two opposing forces: the
asset-market force which leads to an increase in inventories and a demand force which does
the opposite. In Appendix D we show that if the long-run elasticity of substitution exceeds
one, then inventories follow a non-monotonic path —rising ﬁrst and declining afterwards—
in response to speculation.
Second, as argued by Frankel (2006) and others, producers are the most eﬃcient inventory-
52In the US, petroleum and crude oil stocks increased between 2000 and 2006 by 307mb and 168mb re-
spectively. Since 2007, US petroleum stocks declined from 1785mb to 1665mb, while crude oil inventories
remained constant at 1020mb. A closer look, however, reveals that non-strategic crude oil inventories de-
creased by 20mb. The only component of US petroleum stocks that increased since 2006 is the Strategic
Petroleum Reserve (SPR) (See Energy Information Administration, Monthly Energy Review, Tables 3.4 and
11.3.). This change in the SPR is a consequence of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, mandating a gradual
increase of the SPR from 700mb to 1000mb. In May 2008, in response to the rapid increase in oil prices,
Congress voted to stop depositing oil in the SPR.
41Figure 15: The Dynamic Consequences of the U.S. Subprime Crisis Followed by a Global Growth
Slowdown. See text for description. Authors’ Calculations.
42holders since they do not need to extract the oil to do so. In our model this amounts to
assuming doilproducer < d, which implies that all inventories are held underground.
Our model is amenable to several interpretations where inventories are just oil in the
ground. Suppose, for example, that new reserves of the Z− good are discovered every period.
More precisely, the stock of discovered reserves increases by Z per unit of time. The economy
cannot consume resources that have not been discovered yet. In addition, suppose that the
rights to these new reserves are not capitalized, either because they accrue to new entrants,
because they are likely to be expropriated, or because they embody unmodelled uncertainty.
This economy would be exactly equivalent to our economy. Under this interpretation, there
are no physical inventories of Z− goods. Inventories just reﬂect discovered and not yet
consumed reserves of the Z-good.
Another, more abstract, interpretation is that of a social contract in M countries. This
(implicit) contract speciﬁes that each generation is entitled to an endowment Z of Z-goods.
They can decide when to sell it. If they do not sell it immediately, they can store it.
Moreover, they can trade rights to future consumption claims on their endowment, that is
they can sell the Z-good forward. They can also acquire the Z good from agents of the same
or diﬀerent generation in M : they can then treat these newly acquired goods exactly as
their own endowment. This economy is once again completely isomorphic to our economy.
Inventories are just goods in the ground.
As we show in Appendix C, the underground inventory holding view has important
implications for the eﬀectiveness of recent proposals to tax speculative transactions in com-
modities.
5.2 The Empirical Link Between Oil Prices and Asset Supply
The asset-role of oil suggests a negative correlation between oil prices and the value of assets
negatively aﬀected by ﬁnancial shocks, and a positive correlation between oil prices and
economic growth. As a starting point we run the simple OLS regression:
∆pt = α + β∆st + γ∆yt + ǫt (23)
where lower case variables are in log, pt denotes the spot price of crude oil, st is the Standard
& Poors 500 index and yt is the monthly U.S. Industrial Production index. In the model, a
decline in the value of bubble assets that lowers stock prices leads to a reallocation towards
43commodities, so we expect to ﬁnd β < 0. A decline in growth should also push down
commodity prices, so we expect γ > 0. Table 9 reports the results of the simple OLS
regression in (23) for the period January 1984 to November 2008. We ﬁnd a negative but
non-signiﬁcant link between oil prices and stock market performance, and a positive and
mostly insigniﬁcant link between growth and oil prices.
There are two obvious issues with the OLS regression. First, as shown in ﬁgure 8, the
apparent correlation is strongly negative only in the ﬁrst phase of the crisis. In the second
phase of the crisis, as explained above, the collapse in global growth reduces both asset and
commodity prices. Second, there is an obvious reverse causality concern. For instance, an
exogenous increase in oil prices could increase the chance of a recession, leading to a decline
in stock returns, or push up inﬂation rates, leading to a tightening of monetary policy, that
would also send equities tumbling. To control for this, we use two instruments: the price of
gold, as well as the performance of ﬁnancial stocks relative to the broader market. Increases
in the price of gold are often associated with ﬂight to quality episodes. In fact, since gold
provides per se little services or yield, it is the perfect example of an asset held for speculative
reasons. The relative performance of ﬁnancials captures the fact that ﬁnancial crises impact
more directly the ﬁnancial sector, while there is no reason for oil shocks to aﬀect this service
sector more than, e.g. energy-intensive transportation or manufacturing sectors.
The top panel of Table 10 presents the IV estimates. We notice that the coeﬃcient on
equities is both much larger, and also strongly signiﬁcant at the daily, weekly, monthly and
quarterly frequencies. The elasticity is always in excess of one. The coeﬃcient on growth
has the correct sign at the quarterly and annual frequency, but appears to be insigniﬁcant.
The bottom panel reports the ﬁrst stage of the IV regression.
Financial relative performance has the right impact on equilibrium assets values at all
frequencies but annual: conditional on growth, bad news in U.S. ﬁnancial markets is good
news for oil as an asset. Conversely, good news in U.S. ﬁnancial markets is bad news for
oil.53
53The results are similar if we restrict the sample to the period before July 2008, preceding the second
phase of the crisis.
44(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
daily weekly monthly quarterly annual daily weekly monthly quarterly annual
SP500 -0.06 -0.01 -0.07 -0.45 -0.44 -0.06 -0.02 -0.11 -0.50 -0.63
(1.41) (0.13) (0.37) (1.59) (1.42) (1.39) (0.17) (0.72) (1.73) (2.57)
Ind. Prod. 1.30 3.10 1.81 1.03 2.23 -0.59
(1.25) (2.04) (1.23) (1.05) (1.11) (0.27)
Lagged:
SP500 0.06 -0.07 -0.07 0.67 0.22
(1.58) (0.83) (0.43) (0.29) (0.67)
Ind. Prod. 2.68 1.07 2.43
(2.02) (0.57) (0.97)
Observations 6233 1296 297 295 286 6232 1295 296 294 285
R-squared 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.04
Table 9: Oil-Stock Market Regressions.Sample period is 1/1/1984-11/8/2008. Dependent variable is
change in log of the spot price of crude; independent variables are change in log S&P 500 and change in
industrial production index. Changes are taken over the end-of-period value for each interval. Quarterly
and annual regressions are run on overlapping monthly data. Eicker-White robust t-statistics are reported
in parentheses for the daily, weekly and monthly regressions; Newey-West t-statistics are reported for the
quarterly and annual regressions, with windows of 2 and 11 months, respectively. Constant included in the
regression and not reported
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
daily weekly monthly quarterly annual
SP500 -1.14 -1.52 -2.96 -3.08 -3.74
(4.95) (3.45) (3.12) (3.71) (1.98)
Ind. Prod. -0.94 3.86 7.99
(0.40) (1.25) (1.39)
First Stage regressions (dependent variable S&P 500)
Financials 0.29 0.28 0.29 0.29 -0.01
(8.55) (5.56) (2.96) (2.75) (0.06)
gold -0.11 -0.08 -0.09 -0.11 -0.28
(3.87) (1.91) (0.94) (1.21) (1.83)
R-squared 0.06 0.06 0.06
Observations 6098 1296 297 295 286
Table 10: Instrumented Oil-Stock Market Regressions. Sample period is 1984-2008. Dependent variable
is change in log of the spot price of crude; independent variables are change in log S&P 500 and change in
Industrial Production Index. Instruments are the log change in the price of S&P 500 ﬁnancials less the S&P
500, and the log change in the price of gold. Changes are taken over the end-of-period value for each interval.
Quarterly and annual regressions are run on overlapping monthly data. Eicker-White robust t-statistics are
reported in parentheses for the daily, weekly and monthly regressions; Newey-West t-statistics are reported
for the quarterly and annual regressions, with windows of 2 and 11 months, respectively. Constant included
in the regression and not reported.
456 Final Discussion
The prevailing view is one of central banks excesses and mistakes leading to excess liquidity,
speculative bubbles, and unavoidable crises. This seems overstated: central banks, when
reasonable, are not nearly as powerful. In this paper we take a contrarian view and provide
an entirely private-sector account of the main facts, without any role for monetary factors.
Reality is probably in between.
Our framework builds on the idea that the world economy entered the crisis with a
chronic excess demand for ﬁnancial assets, where the subprime market development may
just have been a (failed) market attempt to bridge this gap. Within this perspective, we
argue that the sharp rise in oil prices following the subprime crisis — nearly 100 percent
in just a matter of months and on the face of recessionary shocks— was the result of a
speculative response to the ﬁnancial crisis itself, in an attempt to rebuild asset supply. That
is, the global economy was subject to one shock with multiple implications rather than to
two separate shocks (ﬁnancial and oil).
Eventually, the persistent ﬁnancial crisis and its many multipliers severely hurt growth
prospects, which triggered and implosion in commodity prices and asset demand more
broadly. However, by the same token, when real conditions recover, our model predicts
that asset demand is likely to rise back, recreating the chronic shortage of assets, and the cy-
cle will start again. Regulation, unless distortionary enough to depress growth, is no match
for these market forces. The real problem is more macroeconomic in nature and unlikely to
go away until the world economy’s ability to generate sound store of value catches up with
its potential income growth. That is, as so much else on these days, it depends largely on
developments within China and other emerging markets.
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48Appendix A
Derivations for Sections 2 and 3
A.1 Asset Decline and Trade Balance when σ < 1 : the petrodol-
lar eﬀect
In this section, we provide the analysis underlying the claims in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 regarding
the case where the elasticity of substitution σ between X and Z is less than one. Formally,
recall that in equilibrium θWt =
 
1 + αp1−σ
t
 
Xt. Because It0 = 0, Wt
+
0 = Vt
+
0 and therefore
Vt
+
0 −
 
Vt
−
0 + Bt
−
0
 
> 0 when σ < 1. This increase in global asset value (when measured in units of
X) mitigates the fall in the value of U-assets. In fact the change in wealth can be expressed as
Bt
−
0 + V U
t
−
0 − V U
t
+
0 = Bt0−
 
1 − xU
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−
α
θ
XU
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p1−σ
t
+
0
− p1−σ
t
−
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. (A.1)
The ﬁrst term on the right hand side of this expression is positive and is exactly the same as in
equation (20). It represents the direct eﬀect of the bubble-burst and also corresponds to the drop in
U′s wealth that would occur in the benchmark no-inventory economy. The second term is negative
in our economy but vanishes in the benchmark no-inventory economy. It represents the drop in
the share of the X good in total consumption, and mitigates the fall in the value of U’s assets.
As we argued earlier, this “petrodollar” term plays a key role in limiting the extent of short-run
rebalancing.
Consider now the impact eﬀects of the growth slowdown shock. We maintain the assumption
of extreme home bias so that immediately before the growth slowdown shock hits, all of U’s wealth
is invested in U assets. The adjustment in the trade balance is always positive:
TBU
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where  t1− = WU
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−
1
/
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1
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. The change in the value of U assets can be computed as above
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Xt − xU
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pt
+
1 − pt
−
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It1.
The second term is negligible if It1 is small. Since the ﬁrst term is equal to 0 when σ = 1, we have
that in this benchmark the impact of the growth slowdown on the trade balance is negligible. By
contrast, when σ < 1, the ﬁrst term is negative and, under our calibration, it swamps the second
term. Thus, the trade balance improves at impact.
49A.2 The Trade Balance in the short Run
In this section we expand on Section 3.1 and analyze the behavior of the trade balance in the short
run both in our economy and in the benchmark no-inventory economy.
We can decompose this diﬀerence more ﬁnely by studying the trade balance decomposition into
exports XU
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.
The three terms on the right hand side have a traditional Marshall-Lerner interpretation: The ﬁrst
one represents the increase in the volume of exports. The second one represents the decrease in
the volume of imports times the terms of trade. These two are positive since the volume of exports
rises and the volume of imports falls. The third term is negative and represents imports times the
change in the terms of trade. Note that the terms of trade eﬀect – the last term– would be absent
in the benchmark no-inventory economy. However, we can show that the positive quantity eﬀect
– the ﬁrst two terms – is stronger in our economy than in the benchmark economy, which means
that the diﬀerence in trade rebalancing between these two economies is strictly less than the direct
eﬀect of the change in terms of trade resulting from speculation in commodities.54
54This can be veriﬁed as follows. The claim amounts to showing that
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50A.3 The Commodity-Price-Jump Term
The drop in interest rates at t = t0 when σ < 1 can be expressed as:
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where where szt is the expenditure share of commodities. The ﬁrst term on the right hand side
represents the ‘bubble-burst’ term discussed in section 1.3. The second term is the ‘commodity-
price-jump’ term introduced in Section 3.3.
A.4 The Numeraire
Throughout we have chosen the X-good as the numeraire. This section conﬁrms the claim in
Section 1.2 that the main substantive results do not depend on this particular choice of numeraire.
The price index corresponding to the composite consumption good is given by
 
1 + αp1−σ
t
 1/(1−σ)
if σ  = 1, and p
α
1+α
t if σ = 1. We term the corresponding numeraire the composite numeraire. We
denote with a tilde the variable expressed in the composite numeraire. The interest rate in the
composite numeraire ˜ rt can be computed from rt as follows:
˜ rt = rt −
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which using (10) we can rewrite as
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. In the rest of this discussion we consider the limit case d = 0.
Let’s now investigate how this change in numeraire would modify our conclusions concerning the
51crash and the steady states. Note that when σ = 1 then we simply have
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Let’s now turn to the drop in wealth and asset value at impact. We have
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The amount of rebalancing is given by   CA
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The right comparison when we use the composite numeraire should be with an economy with
exogenous commodity prices. With endogenous commodity prices, the interest rate drops more.
The drop in asset value is also more pronounced because the trees pay dividend in X-goods the
value of which depreciates at impact. Both eﬀects contribute to more rebalancing with endogenous
commodity prices. A counterbalancing eﬀect is that the value of GDP goes down since GDP is
composed of X goods, the value of which depreciates at impact. This last eﬀect contributes to less
rebalancing.
Another quantity we could look at is the amount of rebalancing as a fraction of GDP   CA
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XU
t0
Xt0
 
+
 
˜ rt
−
0 − ˜ rt
+
0
  
˜ V U
t
−
0 + ˜ BU
t0− − ˜ WU
t
−
0
  V U
t
+
0
V U
t
−
0
+ BU
t0−
.
With this normalization, endogenous commodity prices only contribute to less rebalancing with
σ = 1 because they lead to lower interest rates.
Let’s now turn to σ < 1. In this case we have ˜ rt = rt
1+αp
1−σ
t
so that
˜ rt
−
0 − ˜ rt
+
0 =
rt
−
0 − rt
+
0
1 + αp1−σ
t
−
0
+ rt
+
0
 
1
1 + αp1−σ
t
−
0
−
1
1 + αp1−σ
t
+
0
 
.
Similarly, we have
˜ V U
t
−
0
+ ˜ BU
t0−
 
1 + αp1−σ
t
−
0
 −1/(1−σ)
XU
t0
−
˜ V U
t
+
0  
1 + αp1−σ
t
+
0
 −1/(1−σ)
XU
t0
=
BU
t0−
XU
t0
 
1 −
XU
t0
Xt0
 
− α
1
θ
 
p1−σ
t
+
0
− p1−σ
t
−
0
 
.
And we can compute   CA
U
t
+
0 /
  
1 + αp1−σ
t
+
0
 −1/(1−σ)
XU
t0
 
−   CA
U
t
−
0 /
  
1 + αp1−σ
t
−
0
 −1/(1−σ)
XU
t0
 

˜ rt
−
0

1 −
˜ WU
t
−
0
˜ V U
t
−
0
+ ˜ BU
t0−

 + θ
˜ WU
t
−
0
˜ V U
t
−
0
+ ˜ BU
t0−





˜ V U
t
−
0
+ ˜ BU
t0−
 
1 + αp1−σ
t
−
0
 −1/(1−σ)
XU
t0
−
˜ V U
t
+
0  
1 + αp1−σ
t
+
0
 −1/(1−σ)
XU
t0



+
 
˜ rt
−
0 − ˜ rt
+
0
 



˜ V U
t
−
0
+ ˜ BU
t0− − ˜ WU
t
−
0  
1 + αp1−σ
t
−
0
 −1/(1−σ)
XU
t0



˜ V U
t
+
0
˜ V U
t
−
0
+ ˜ BU
t0−
 
1 + αp1−σ
t
−
0
 −1/(1−σ)
 
1 + αp1−σ
t
+
0
 −1/(1−σ)
53Hence when net positions are small compared to gross positions endogenous commodity prices
can lead to less rebalancing. All the qualitative conclusions of the paper remain unchanged.
Appendix B
Derivations for Section 4
In this appendix, we provide the analysis underlying the calibration and the dynamic system
in Section 4.
B.1 The bubble economy: t < t0.
We start the economy in the bubble equilibrium with σ < 1, for t < t0. The economy is characterized
by the following equations:
˙ Bt = rtBt
rt =
δθ + θgBt/Xt + αˆ q1−σX
1/σ−1
t g (1/σ − 1)
1 + αˆ q1−σX
1/σ−1
t
where ˆ q ≡ pt/X
1/σ
t = (α/Z)
1/σ is constant. This is a diﬀerential system in Bt with a forcing term
Xt. It requires a terminal condition. To ﬁnd this terminal condition, we need to characterize the
path of the economy, in the event that the bubble does not collapse. Observe that pt = ˆ qX
1/σ
t , hence
the share of consumption expenditures on the Z-good, szt = αp1−σ
t /
 
1 + αp1−σ
t
 
, is increasing
without bounds. The transition to σ = 1 must occur at some time T1 such that αˆ q1−σX
1/σ−1
T1 = α′.
From T1 onwards, the elasticity of substitution is equal to one. The bubble economy with σ = 1
reaches its steady state instantly with:
rt = g ; qt = α′/Z (B.1)
Wt
Xt
=
1 + α′
θ
;
Vt
Xt
=
V U
t
XU
t
=
δ
g
Bt =
 
1 + α′
θ
−
δ
g
 
Xt
This provides the terminal condition for the value of the bubble at time T1− : BT1− =
 
(1+α′)
θ − δ
g
 
XT1.
Solving backwards from t = T1, we can then characterize the entire path
 
Bt,Wt,Vt,V U
t ,pt
 
that
is expected to occur in the absence of a collapse of the bubble.
This global system is consistent with any initial net foreign asset position at t = t0. Assume that
we want to start the economy with an external debt NAU
t0 = ηXU
t0. Under the assumption that the
54bubble is initially located in U, this implies that U’s savings are equal to WU
t0 = V U
t0 + Bt0 + ηXU
t0.
One can then solve for the path of domestic savings from the asset accumulation equation. In turn,
this pins down net foreign assets NAU
t = WU
t −V U
t −Bt, the current account CAU
t = ˙ WU
t − ˙ V U
t − ˙ Bt
and the trade balance TBU
t = XU
t − θWU
t in all previous periods.
B.2 Collapse of the bubble: the short run.
Consider now what happens at time t = t0 when the bubble collapses. As long as σ < 1, the
economy satisﬁes the following equations:
˙ It = Z − αˆ q−σ
t
˙ ˆ qt =
 
rt −
g
σ
 
ˆ qt
rt =
X
1−1/σ
t θδ + θgˆ qtIt − θˆ qt
 
Z − αˆ q−σ
t
 
X
1−1/σ
t + ασˆ q1−σ
t
This is a dynamic system in I and ˆ q with a forcing term Xt. We have one initial condition:
It0 = 0, by assumption. We need a terminal condition on ˆ qt. To ﬁnd it, consider what happens to
the share of commodities in expenditures, αp1−σ
t /
 
1 + αp1−σ
t
 
over time. From the second equation
above, the growth rate of p1−σ
t = ˆ q1−σ
t X
1/σ−1
t is (1 − σ)(rt − g/σ)+g (1/σ − 1) = (1 − σ)rt, which
must be positive eventually (since the interest rate converges to g/σ). Hence the expenditure share
must eventually reach ¯ sz, at which point the elasticity of substitution becomes unity. Let’s denote
T2 the time at which this happens, and ˆ qT2−, IT2− the values of the system at that time. Note that
ˆ qT2 and T2 are also linked by αˆ q1−σ
T2 X
1/σ−1
T2 = α′. Thus, we can parameterize potential equilibrium
paths by T2.
B.3 Collapse of the bubble: the long run.
When t ≥ T2, the economy is now in the unitary elasticity inventory model described in the previous
section. The system follows a saddle path dynamics with:
˙ It = Z − α′q−1
t
˙ qt = (rt − g)qt
rt = θ
δ + α′ − qt (Z − gIt)
1 + α′
where qt = pt/Xt. The boundary conditions for that system are IT2 = IT2− and limt→∞ qt =
α′/Z. Solving the saddle-path dynamics provides the unique initial value qT2+ that is consistent
with the equilibrium (see ﬁgure 9).
55Lastly, continuity of the price at T2 requires that we select T2 such that ˆ qT2− = qT2+X
(1−1/σ)
T2 .
This completes the characterization of the economy.
Appendix C
Speculation and Policy
In this appendix, we expand on Section 5 and analyze the eﬀect of introducing futures markets,
as well as the eﬀects of policies aimed at curtailing ”speculation”.
C.1 Futures
Let us start by introducing (fully collateralized) future contracts on the Z-good. We make two
simple and related points: (i) ﬁrst, the payoﬀ of the strategy that consists in buying the Z-good and
storing it can be replicated by simple futures positions; (ii) second, in our model, the introduction
of futures market has no impact on the equilibrium.
By covered interest parity, the forward rate ft+s is equal to:
ft+s = pt exp
  t+s
t (ru+d)du .
Consider the strategy of buying a forward contract at t with maturity t + s and reselling it at
date t + s′ < t + s. The payoﬀ at t + s′ is
pt+s′ − pt exp
  t+s
t (ru+d)du exp−
  t+s
t+s′(ru+d)du = pt+s′ − pt exp
  t+s′
t (ru+d)du
which, in net present value, is exactly the same payoﬀ as that of buying one unit of the Z-good at
t, storing it until t+ s′ and then selling it on the spot market at t+ s′. To the extent that there is
heterogeneity in the storage cost that agents need to pay to store the Z-good, all the inventories
will be held by the agents with the lowest storage costs – typically the producers, who can at least
partly leave the Z-good in the ground. Agents with higher storage costs will prefer to buy future
contracts from the producers.
C.2 Equilibrium and policy
However, the introduction of futures contracts has absolutely no eﬀect on the equilibrium of our
economy. Futures do not increase asset supply: every long position is oﬀset by a corresponding
short position, and there are no agents with biased beliefs deviating from the prefect foresight
56price-path. As a result, the imposition of a tax on futures trading, or their prohibition, would have
absolutely no moderating eﬀect on commodity prices.
In order for a tax to have any consequence in our model, it must aﬀect the agent with the smallest
storage costs, which hold the inventories. Thus, let us consider the eﬀect of taxing producers for
holding inventories. While in practice this is extremely hard to do since producers are likely to
hold most of their inventories underground, it is a useful positive exercise to gauge the potential
impact of these type of policies.
It turns out that taxes on the value of inventory holdings are almost isomorphic with the holding
cost parameter d, except that that under the tax interpretation, the proceeds can be rebated lump
sum to the agents at no resource cost. We take the latter route here and let τ denote the tax rate
per unit of value of inventories (that is, the tax per unit of inventory is τpt
We maintain the assumption that σ = 1 but strengthen the dynamic ineﬃciency Assumption 1
to:
Assumption 3 g − τ > θδ
1+α.
Under Assumption 3, the bubbleless steady state of the economy is now such that the interest
rate is given by
rt = g − τ,
the price grows at rate g
pt = α
Xt
Z
and long run inventories are constant
It =
1 + α
α
1
θ(g − τ)
 
g − τ − rref
 
Z.
The long run level inventory function I (τ) is decreasing with respect to τ while the price of oil is
unaﬀected since the relative consumption of X and Z goods is unchanged in the long run. However,
in the short run, the imposition of a tax τ lowers inventories and the price of oil which is equal to
pt = αXt/
 
Z − ˙ It
 
.
In summary, a tax on inventories reduces the level of these and succeeds in temporarily depress-
ing the price of the Z good but it does not aﬀect it in the long run. Note also that the tax reduces
the equilibrium interest rate and aggravates dynamic ineﬃciency in the bubbleless equilibrium, at
a cost for the economy. The intuition is transparent. A dynamically ineﬃcient economy is charac-
terized by a scarcity of assets. A tax on inventories discourages the accumulation of inventories and
hence reduces asset supply. The interest rate has to adjust downward to clear the asset market.55
55Note that the bubbly equilibrium of the economy is not aﬀected by τ. Moreover, if Assumption 3 is
violated, then the bubbleless equilibrium becomes identical to that of the benchmark no-inventory economy.
57Appendix D
Declining Inventories
In this appendix we expand on a remark in Section 5 and analyze formally the consequences for
inventory accumulation of allowing the short-run and long-run elasticity of substitution between
good X and good Z to diﬀer. In most analyses of commodity price and inventory dynamics, the
forward curve for commodity prices plays a central role. In our model, after the shock, the world
is deterministic and risk-neutral to that at date t, the forward price s periods ahead ft+s is simply
the future spot price pt+s. In our case, it will prove more convenient to reason in terms of the
log-forward curve which trace logft+s = logpt+s as a function of maturity s.
The decision to accumulate inventories is determined by a comparison of the slope of the log-
forward curve
˙ pt
pt of the price for the Z good with the level of the interest rate rt. The steeper
the slope of the log-forward curve for the price of the Z good, the higher the expected growth in
the price of the Z good, and the more storage is attractive. Similarly, the lower the level of the
interest rate, the more storage is attractive. The elasticity σ of the demand for the Z good is a key
parameter governing the slope of the log-forward curve. The higher σ, the ﬂatter the log-forward
curve.
Key to our analysis is the basic idea that the short-run elasticity of demand for commodities σ
is low in the short run but high in the long run. Let us denote by σshort the short-run elasticity and
by σlong the long-run elasticity with σshort < 1 < σlong. The switch from σshort to σlong is typically
gradual, and potentially governed by a number of time and state dependent factors. If the long-run
elasticity σlong of the demand for the Z good is high enough, then inventories will eventually be
undone. This is formalized by the following assumption.
Assumption 4
g
σlong < δθ
This assumption is more likely to be veriﬁed, the higher is σlong. When it is veriﬁed, then
the long run steady-state of the economy features no inventories. In the long run steady state,
the interest rate is δθ. The price of the Z-good is given by (αXt/Z)
1
σlong = pt and grows at rate
a g/σlong which is too low to make the accumulation of inventories worthwhile. The share of the
Z-good in total consumption converges to 0, and the economy eﬀectively behaves as an economy
without commodities.
Turning to transitional dynamics, imagine that the economy enters the region with σ = σlong >
1 with positive inventories It > 0.The presence of inventories aﬀects both the goods market and the
asset market: the total intertemporal supply of the Z-good is higher which depresses the price of
the Z-good pt. Asset supply is higher since inventories act as a store of value, resulting in a higher
interest rate rt. The desire to reduce inventories can be traced back to how those two markets are
58aﬀected, as the following two equations show
˙ It = Z − αp−σ
t Xt and
˙ It
Xt
− g
It
Xt
=
1 + ασp1−σ
t
ptθ
(θδ − rt).
Hence a process of inventory reduction is initiated and the economy eventually converges to a
steady-state with no-inventories.
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